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EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF RCRA SECTION
6972(a)(1)(B)-A CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 1992,1 an innocent purchaser of contaminated property,
Kentucky Fried Chicken Western, Inc. (KFC), filed suit seeking equitable
restitution 2 under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act3 (RCRA)
section 6972(a)(1)(B)4 from the Meghrigs, the prior owners of the property, for
the several hundred thousand dollars that KFC spent remediating the property. 5
The property was contaminated with refined petroleum waste products, lead and
1. The facts which follow are taken from KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir.
1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). They are illustrative of the facts which typically give rise to
a plaintiff's use of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), the citizen suit provision of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.
2. Restitution is a form of equitable relief. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, AMERICAN LEGAL
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 1994). The basic purpose of restitution is to disgorge
the defendant of unjust enrichment enjoyed at the plaintiff's expense. Id. at 646. By contrast,
compensatory damages are a remedy at law and are intended to compensate plaintiffs for injury or
harm they have suffered. See id. at 3, 7.
Even though restitution is traditionally treated as an equitable remedy, the "law/equity
distinction is especially murky" with regard to restitution. Id. at 7. Furthermore, Professor
Laycock states that restitution is available at both law and in equity. Id. Classification of the
monetary relief sought by citizen plaintiffs under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) is difficult to achieve. See
Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that while the court assumes that the
plaintiffs seek relief in the form of equitable restitution, the relief sought "looks to us suspiciously
like money damages"). See also Richard L. Bradford, The Personal Injury Endorsement: An
Unwarranted Straining to Obtain Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage, 11 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 111, 114 (1995) (commenting that under RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B), a plaintiff may
recover "restitution," but then labeling such restitution as "money damages"). Because a
classification of the remedies typically sought by plaintiffs under RCRA's citizen suit provision is
beyond the scope of this note, the term "restitution" will be used to refer to the type of monetary
relief sought by plaintiffs under the statute. However, the term "damages" will be used in reference
to case law that has classified the relief as such.
3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, as
amended by The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6981 (1988)) [hereinafter RCRA].
4. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988). Because 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) has been compiled
in WEST, SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STATUTES 683 (1996-97 educational ed. 1996), this note
refers to RCRA's citizen suit imminent hazard provision as either 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) or as
RCRA § 7002(a)(l)(B). See Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). Similarly, this
note refers to the EPA Administrator's companion imminent hazard provision as either 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973 or RCRA § 7003. See Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) RCRA § 7003.
5. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 519.
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benzene.6 Prior to selling the property to KFC, the Meghrigs operated a
gasoline station on it! The Meghrigs' alleged negligent operation of this filling
station resulted in a leakage of petroleum from underground storage tanks on the
property, causing the contamination.'
KFC purchased the property, which is located in Los Angeles, California,
from the Meghrigs in 1975.' Since that time KFC has owned and operated a
restaurant on the property."0 The Meghrigs never disclosed the contamination
to KFC." KFC discovered the contamination in October, 1988, in the course
of making property improvements. 2 The contamination appeared to have been
caused by miscellaneous petroleum spills, as well as leakage from underground
storage tanks located on the property prior to the time that KFC acquired the
property. 3
Upon discovering the presence of hazardous waste on the property, the City
of Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety issued an order forbidding
KFC from proceeding with any further construction on the property pending a
clearance order issued from the Los Angeles County Department of Health
Services (DHS).' 4 Subsequently, KFC spent over $211,000 to remediate the
property.' 5 KFC completed its cleanup of the property in March of 1989, but
6. Respondent's Brief at *2, 1995 WL 728551, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct.
1251 (1996) (No. 95-83). See also KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 519 (noting that the soil at the property
contained elevated levels of these refined petroleum products).
7. KFC Western v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518,519 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Respondent's Brief at *2, KFC Western (No. 95-83). See also KFC Western, 49 F.3d at
519 (explaining that KFC continues to own and operate a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise on the
property at issue).
11. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 519.
12. Id. See also Respondent's Brief at *2, 1995 WL 728551, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig,
116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83).
13. Respondent's Brief at *2, KFC Western (No. 95-83).
14. KFC Western v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996). "Although KFC neither caused the contamination nor owned the property when the
contamination occurred, the DHS ordered KFC to clean up the property." Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. See also Respondent's Brief at *2, KFC Western (No. 95-83). The remediation costs
in KFC Western were relatively minimal. Remediation of contaminated property can run into the
billions of dollars. See, e.g., United States Seeks $1.9 Billion from Shell in Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Contamination Suit, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1436 (Dec. 16. 1983) (anticipating $1.9 billion for
cleanup costs); Petro Processors Settlement Reached Including $50 Million Cleanup of Two Sites,
14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1461 (Dec. 23, 1983) (forecasting a $50 million cleanup). See also Ascon
Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1989) (estimating that the cost of
cleaning up a particular parcel of contaminated property would cost between $251,780,580 and
$260,075,100); William D. Evans, Jr., Judicial Relief From Superfund Claims: Some Good News,
Possibly Fleeting, for Bankers, 111 BANKING L.J. 4, 6 (1994) (noting that cleanup costs under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) can run in
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DHS did not issue a formal clearance order until May of 1989.16 In June of
1990, KFC asked the Meghrigs for reimbursement of costs expended in cleaning
up the contamination, but the Meghrigs refused. 7 KFC commenced its action
against the Meghrigs in federal district court on May 29, 1992, seeking
restitution from the Meghrigs under RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B). 5 Initially,
KFC was permitted to recover restitution from the Meghrigs;' 9 however, the
United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision.' The Court's
decision limits private citizen"' causes of action under RCRA, creating a
setback for environmental protection.'
The need for citizen participation in the preservation and restoration of the
environment is critical because current environmental protection is deficient, and
Congressional action threatens to impose measures which will further limit
environmental preservation.' One vehicle for private environmental action is
the citizen suit provision found in RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B). RCRA is a
federal statute designed to regulate hazardous waste.' It is administered by the
excess of $20 million).
Although in KFC Western, a local environmental agency issued the cleanup order to KFC, it
is worth noting that often it is the EPA that issues cleanup orders to defendants. See, e.g., United
States Envtl. Protection Agency v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984). If a defendant fails to promptly
comply with an administrative cleanup order issued by the EPA under RCRA, the resulting penalties
can be severe. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
16. Respondent's Brief at *2, KFC Western (No. 95-83).
17. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 519.
18. Id. See also Respondent's Brief at *2-3, 1995 WL 728551, KFC Western, Inc. v.
Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83).
19. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 521.
20. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254, 1256 (1996).
21. Section 6972 governs "citizen" suits; however, any "person" may bring suit under this
section. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). The statute defines the term "person" as:
"[Aln individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation),
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a state .... ." 42
U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1994).
22. See infra section I/I.E.
23. See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1994). See Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Pollution Control Laws: 7he Citizen Suit Provisions, C127 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. 997, 1002 (1995) (noting that RCRA is potentially one of the most effective legal tools
available to not only citizen environmental activists, but also to private parties who seek injunctive
relief and restitution). For an examination of the amendments to RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) proposed
in this note, see infra section V.
25. The term "hazardous waste" is defined as:
[A] solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).' Amended significantly in 1984 by
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA),27 section 6972(a)(1)(B)
is the current version of RCRA's citizen suit provision? While the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act'
(CERCLA), as well as common law remedies, produce inequities for
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1994).
26. Created in 1970 and considered part of the executive branch, the EPA is a federal agency
which is authorized by Congress to administer various environmental statutes designed to preserve
the environment. Cynthia Anne Oppliger, Note, Putting Recovery Back into RCRA: An Effective
Addition to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 59, 65 n.30 (1990).
In addition to RCRA, other environmental statutes that are administered by the EPA include the
following: The National Environmental Policies Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994),
which declares the nation's environmental policy of promoting the general welfare, as well as
creating and maintaining conditions under which humans and nature can exist in productive
harmony; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994), which regulates the emission of
harmful pollutants into the air so as to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air resources;
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994), which regulates the
discharge of harmful pollutants into the nation's surface waters so as to promote the restoration and
maintenance of the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's waters; the Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f-300j-26 (1994), which regulates contaminant levels of
pollution in drinking water; the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994),
which regulates the production, use, and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures, while also
promoting the collection and development of adequate data for chemical substances and mixtures;
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994), which provides for the cleanup of abandoned, inactive hazardous waste sites;
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1994). Congress
empowers the EPA to create regulations and to employ statutory enforcement mechanisms as the
means of administering the federal environmental statutes. In order to clarify EPA regulations, the
EPA often publishes guidance documents that explain the EPA Administrator's policy directives
associated with the implementation of the environmental regulations. Oppliger, supra, at 65 n.30.
27. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(1984) [Hereinafter HSWA]. See also Adam Babich, RCRA Imminent Hazard Authority: A
Powerful Tool for Businesses, Governments, and Citizen Enforcers, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10122 (1994) (noting the 1984 amendments to RCRA).
28. The HSWA expanded the powers afforded citizens in the role of environmental cleanup.
Melinda H. Van der Reis, Comment, An Amendment for the Environment: Alternative Liability and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1269, 1283-84 (1994).
For a discussion of the increase in citizen authority vested in § 6972(a)(1)(B) after the HSWA, see
infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text. See also John E. Sullivan, Implied Private Causes of
Action and the Recoverability ofDamages Underhe RCRA Citizen Suit Provision, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10408, 10408 (1995) ("In 1984, Congress expanded the role of citizen enforcers
under § 7002 as part of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) to RCRA.").
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/7
1996] EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF RCRA 195
plaintiffs, 3°  RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) can potentially resolve these
injustices.3 However, before section 6972(a)(1)(B) can effectively address the
obstacles citizen plaintiffs face under CERCLA and the common law, it must be
modified yet again. 32 Currently, the statute's ambiguous drafting contains
timing problems, offers only limited remedies, and poses a number of
procedural difficulties for private plaintiffs. Revisions to RCRA's citizen suit
provision will create a legal scheme which will give the federal courts the
jurisdiction needed to grant a full range of equitable relief to private
plaintiffs.33
Typically, property owners respond to hazardous and solid waste
contamination on their properties by first cleaning up the contamination and then
seeking recovery of their cleanup costs from the parties responsible for
contaminating the property.' Recently, property owners have turned to RCRA
section 6972(a)(1)(B) in an attempt to recover response costs 35 from responsible
parties.3 However, most courts do not interpret section 6972(a)(1)(B) to allow
30. For example, under CERCLA, relief is not available to plaintiffs whose property is
contaminated with petroleum. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994). Relief is also denied for solid
waste contamination under CERCLA. J. Martin Robertson, Restitution under RCRA §
7002(a)(1)(B): The Couru Finally Grant What Congress Authorized, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10491, 10495 (1995). See also infra section IV.A. Similarly, the common law presents a
number of bars to private party remedies, such as difficult proof problems, short state limitations
periods, and costliness. See infra section IV.B.
31. For an examination of the amendments to RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) proposed in this note, see
infra section V.
32. See infra section V.
33. See infra section V.
34. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. The typical suit is between the current
property owner and the prior owner of the property. However, situations may arise in which the
entity responsible for contaminating the property is not the prior owner of property in question, but
the current or prior owner of neighboring property. Still another permutation of the parties to a
RCRA citizen suit can involve the current property owner and an entity which is neither a prior
owner nor a neighbor to the contaminated property. See Agricultural Excess and Surplus Ins. Co.
v. A.B.D. Tank & Pump Co., No. 95C3681, 1996 WL 11122, *3 (N.D. 111. Jan. 8, 1996)
(considering whether the manufacturer and designer of underground storage tanks that subsequently
leaked hazardous waste was liable as a contributor under § 6972(a)(1)(B)).
35. The term "response costs" is used to refer to the costs a party incurs remediating
contaminated property. CERCLA uses this term. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), 9611(a) (1988).
Numerous cases have also used this term. See, e.g., Key Tronic, Corp. v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1960, 1963 (1994); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 569 (1986); CMC Heartland Partners
v. Union Pac. R.R., 78 F.3d 285, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1996); Virginia Properties, Inc. v. Home Ins.
Co., 74 F.3d 1131, 1134 (1lth Cir. 1996).
36. See generally Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1101 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying a private
party's request for restitution under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)); KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49
F.3d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting a private party's recovery of cleanup costs under RCRA
6972(a)(1)(B)), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996); Kaufman & Broad-South Bay, Inc. v. Unisys Corp.,
822 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (denying a private party's request for restitution under
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such recovery.37 Indeed, the ambiguous language in RCRA's citizen suit
provision presents several problems for private' litigants.39
The over-arching problem with RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) concerns the
available remedies for private party plaintiffs.' Because Congress does not
expressly authorize private parties to seek restitution for cleanup costs under
section 6972(a)(1)(B), the courts must imply a private cause of action in order
to allow plaintiffs restitution.4' Prior to the Supreme Court's Meghrig v. KFC
Western4 2 decision, a split had developed between the federal circuits regarding
whether restitution should be implied as an available remedy under the citizen
RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B)); Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(denying a private party's request for injunctive relief under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Commerce
Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying a private party's
request for restitution under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)). See also Miller, supra note 24, at 1002
(noting the increasing number of suits being brought under RCRA's citizen suit provision).
37. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. See also infra text accompanying note 169.
38. The designations "private plaintiffs," "private party litigants," and "private parties" will
be used interchangeably throughout this note to refer to citizen plaintiffs who seek relief for
contamination on their own properties, rather than plaintiffs who sue to remedy general
environmental wrongs on government property or property owned by others. The Ninth Circuit
used the term "private plaintiff" in its KFC Western opinion. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 520. See
also Jean Buo-lin Chen Fung, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig: The Merits and Implications of
Awarding Restitution to Citizen Plaintiffs UnderRCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B), 22 EcOLOGY L.Q. 785, 786
(1995) (using the term "private plaintiffs"). At least one commentator has used the term "private
parties." Robertson, supra note 30, at 10491.
39. In fact, in its KFC Western decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal circuit court to allow private plaintiffs the remedy of equitable restitution
under § 6972(a)(1)(B). See Fung, supra note 38, at 841. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits refused to do so, as did numerous federal district courts. See infra notes 168,
267-68 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested in dicta that allowing private plaintiffs such a
remedy would be inappropriate. Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th
Cir. 1983).
40. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10408 (discussing Congress' failure to provide private party
plaintiffs an express cause of action for damage recovery under RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B)).
41. Id. But see Robertson, supra note 30, at 10491 (arguing that Congress authorized a broad
grant of equitable jurisdiction in RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)). For a discussion of the courts which have
considered whether a private restitution cause of action exists under RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B), see
supra note 36 and accompanying text..
42. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). For purposes of clarification for
the reader, the Ninth Circuit's disposition of the case at issue will be referred to as KFC Western
in this note, while the United States Supreme Court's disposition of the same case, unanimously
reversing the Ninth Circuit, will be referred to as Meghig.
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suit provision. 3 In Furrer v. Brown," the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to imply a private cause of action for restitution under RCRA's citizen
suit provision.' Instead, the court held that RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
supports neither an express nor implied cause of action for restitution by owners
who incur costs remediating contaminated property.' The Eighth Circuit also
held that only injunctive relief is available to plaintiffs under RCRA's citizen suit
provision.47  However, in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig,4 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit implied a private cause of action for restitution.4 9
After granting certiorari to address the split in the circuits, the United States
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding.'
The analysis employed to determine whether a private cause of action for
restitution exists under the statute generally involves two critical and overlapping
questions. First, section 6972(a)(1)(B) presents a question concerning timing,
requiring courts to determine whether "an imminent and substantial
endangerment" 5 must exist at the time the plaintiff files suit.52 In Meghrig,
the Supreme Court held that such a danger must exist at the time suit is
brought. 3 A plaintiff, therefore, may not bring suit after the contamination is
removed from the property because the waste no longer poses an imminent and
substantial endangerment.' However, the requirement of bringing suit during
43. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to one of the circuit court cases, KFC
Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, in order to resolve the split between the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits. Official Transcript at 24, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig,
49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). The Court identified this split as being
based on what relief is recoverable under the statute. Id. at 24-25.
44. 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
45. Id. at 1100.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
49. Id. at 521.
50. Meghrig v. KFC Western, 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254, 1256 (1996).
51. For an examination of this statutory language and the context in which it is used, see 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). See also infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
52. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not decide the timing question presented
by § 6972(a)(1)(B) because the plaintiffs in that case did not allege that the property presented an
imminent and substantial endangerment, as it was remediated prior to the filing of the suit. Furrer
v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1095 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995). However, it is worth noting that the Furrer
court stated that an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment" is
required by § 6972(a)(1)(B). Id. In comparison, the KFC Western majority decided both questions
raised by the statute. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 520-21.
53. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1254.
54. Id. at 1255.
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an imminent and substantial endangerment period can be remarkably problematic
for plaintiffs.55
Property owners subjected to a government cleanup order' may be forced
to remove the waste before bringing suit against the responsible parties. 57 As
a result, the imminent and substantial endangerment is eliminated prior to the
time that the property owner sues the responsible party.5" If a property owner
cannot or will not comply promptly with a government cleanup order,59 courts
may levy civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day against the owner' or may
mandate that the owner conduct extensive site investigations.6" Worse yet,
failure to comply by an owner can result in criminal sanctions.62 Criminal
sanctions can be comprised of imprisonment or fines of up to $50,000 per day,
or both.' Therefore, delaying compliance with the government order with the
intention of suing the responsible party for injunctive relief while the
endangerment continues to exist is not a viable option for property owners.'
Another reason why private plaintiffs may find it difficult to delay compliance
is that Congress prohibits private enforcement actions where the government is
55. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that to require a plaintiff to sue during
the period in which the site presents an imminent and substantial endangerment "would be an
'absurd and unnecessary' requirement." KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989)),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). See id. at 524 (noting the difficulties raised by requiring a plaintiff
to sue for relief prior to the time that the property ceases to present an imminent and substantial
endangerment).
56. The issuance of a government cleanup order is not the only thing that a property owner may
suffer. For example, the private owner may be denied permits to operate a business or make
improvements to the property. Id. at 519.
57. The KFC Western court held that because private citizens are subject to government cleanup
orders as a result of owning contaminated property, and because these property owners cannot
control the timing of the imposition of a government order, it is more important that citizen plaintiffs
be permitted restitution than government plaintiffs. Id. at 524.
58. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996). See also KFC Western, 49
F.3d at 524.
59. Cleanup orders may be levied by state or local agencies under state statutes or local
ordinances substantially similar to RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7) (1988).
60. Id. § 6928(c). Such penalties can easily exceed several million dollars. See United States
Envtl. Protection Agency v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 917 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1990)
(assessing civil penalties of $2,800,000).
61. JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTE
149 (2d ed. 1993)
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1)-(7) (1988).
63. Id.
64. See KFC Western, Inc., v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (alluding to the
timing problem property owners face when subjected to a government cleanup order, and stating that
"public policy concerns might favor allowing a plaintiff to clean contaminated property first and seek
reimbursement later"), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
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already prosecuting an action to remedy the property.' If a property owner
receives a government cleanup order, the government is technically prosecuting
an action, and the property owner is barred from recovery from the responsible
party.6
In addition to the problems raised by RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)'s timing
issue, the statute raises another troublesome issue for plaintiffs. The second
question presented by section 6972(a)(1)(B) concerns what kind of relief is
available to a private party.67 RCRA's citizen suit provision compels courts
to determine whether a private plaintiff has a cause of action for both equitable
restitution and injunctive relief, or injunctive relief only." In Meghrig, the
Supreme Court construed the statute as permitting only an injunctive remedy,
rather than an award of restitution for past cleanup costs.' According to the
Court, injunctive relief under the statute encompasses prohibitory injunctions,
65. Adam Babich & Kent E. Hanson, Opportunitiesfor Environmental Enforcement and Cost
Recovery by Local Governments and Citizen Organizations, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10165, 10171 (1988). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) (1988).
66. See Babich & Hanson, supra note 65, at 10171 (arguing that there is no similar limit on
recovery under CERCLA).
67. The statute appears to permit two forms of injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)
(1988). First, it allows the district court jurisdiction "to restrain" anyone who has contributed or
is contributing to an imminent and substantial endangerment. Id. This type of injunction is
prohibitory in nature. See LACOCK, supra note 2, at 3. It is a court order requiring a defendant to
refrain from doing some specific action. Id. A prohibitory injunction is intended to prevent a future
harmful act, such as requiring a defendant to stop contaminating a plaintiff's property. See Douglas
Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1065, 1073 (1979).
Second, the statute permits the district court jurisdiction to order the defendant "to take . . .
other action as may be necessary." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). This type of injunctive relief is
referred to as a mandatory injunction. See Brief for Petitioner at *14, 1995 WL 668003, KFC
Western Inc. v. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83). It requires a defendant to take
affirmative action, such as to clean up the contamination on the plaintiff's property. See LACOCK,
supra note 2, at 3. The statute does not expressly permit the award of response costs, either in the
form of compensatory damages or in the form of equitable restitution. See 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B).
68. Prior to the KFC Western decision, only one district court construed the scope of relief
available to plaintiffs under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) as permitting restitution to private parties. See
Bayless Inv. & Trading Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1428 (D. Ariz.
May 26, 1994). Numerous other courts have denied such relief. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 315-16 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to allow a plaintiff to recover
reimbursement of past response costs in an action under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Gache v. Town
of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to permit a plaintiff to recover
past remediation costs under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)). The Furrer court, which denied restitution
to private plaintiffs under the statute, did not address the statute's timing issue in its holding, but
premised its decision solely on the question of what kind of relief a plaintiff is entitled to under
RCRA's citizen suit provision. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1095 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995).
69. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254-55 (1996). The Court left open the
question of whether a private party can obtain future costs under the statute. See id. at 1256. See
also infra notes 347-54 and accompanying text.
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allowing the plaintiff to preclude the responsible party from further disposing of
the waste, and mandatory injunctions, permitting the plaintiff to compel the
responsible party to attend to the cleanup and removal of the waste.'
However, plaintiffs may be forced to wait a long period of time for the
responsible party to remove the waste."' This is counter-intuitive to RCRA's
purpose of promoting prompt cleanup of wastes.' It would be consistent with
the statute's objectives to allow the owner to quickly remediate the property and
sue later for restitution.' Nevertheless, the statute's current remedial scheme
does not permit such a course of action.74 Consequently, a plaintiff cannot
recover costs from the responsible party for funds it expended to clean up the
property. 75 Denying restitution to private plaintiffs who incur costs by cleaning
up contaminated property that they did not pollute is an unfair outcome. 76 This
outcome does not promote individual responsibility for waste disposal, inhibits
RCRA's goal of prompt waste cleanup, and detracts from the power of the
citizen suit provision as a waste cleanup tool.77
Nevertheless, several factors support the Court's holding in Meghrig. First,
the legislative history on the availability of a private cause of action for
restitution under RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) is nebulous at best.' Second,
current United States Supreme Court doctrine restricts implied statutory causes
of action, especially where the legislative history fails to clearly delineate a
70. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. See also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. For example, the responsible party may not have the financial means to remediate the
property.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988). "The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy
of the United States that . . .the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as
expeditiously as possible." Id.
73. See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Prompt ... action [is] the
most important consideration [under RCRA]."). The Price court indicated that a proper course of
action may be for the plaintiff to remediate property first and seek reimbursement later. Id.
74. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1254-55.
75. Private plaintiffs were denied restitution in Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1101 (8th Cir.
1995). The Furrer court stated: "Our holding leaves the Furrers without a remedy under § 6972
for the recovery of the costs they have incurred in cleaning up their property. We are not
unsympathetic to the Furrers' case but we cannot justify inferring a remedy under § 6972." Id.
76. See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (stressing the
unfairness and poor public policy of refusing to allow plaintiffs restitution under RCRA's citizen suit
provision), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
77. See infra section ll.B. for a discussion of the importance of citizen suits.
78. See, e.g., SENATE COMMTTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, SOLID WASTE UTILIZATION ACT OF
1976; S. REP. No. 94-988, at 17-18 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 68 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6245, 6307; H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
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congressional intent to create a cause of action.' Finally, the conspicuous
absence of an express private cause of action for restitution under RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B) strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to create a private
cause of action.' In light of these points, the Supreme Court's reversal of the
Ninth Circuit's holding in KFC Western,8' leaving the private plaintiff without
a means of reimbursement for waste removal response costs, is not surprising.
Thus, this Note contends that the timing problem and the lack of adequate
available remedies and statutory ambiguities faced by private party plaintiffs
attempting to make use of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) cannot be adequately
resolved by any court, including the United States Supreme Court.' This Note
proposes a congressional revision of RCRA's citizen suit provision that will
expressly allow a private cause of action for restitution. 3 Such a grant would
not only facilitate the cleanup and rehabilitation of hazardous properties in
keeping with RCRA's purpose, but would also serve to compensate innocent
parties who incur costs by cleaning up property which they did not
contaminate.84
Section II of this Note will examine RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)85 and
discuss the importance of citizen suit provisions in the environmental law
framework." In Section III, this Note will evaluate the current judicial
treatment of the problems presented by RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) by
examining KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig,s7 Furrer v. Brown," .Meghrig v.
KFC Western, Inc."9 and by analyzing the inadequacy of this treatment."
Section IV will discuss the viability of legislative action amending RCRA's
79. For a general overview of Supreme Court doctrine in this area, see infra notes 205-13 and
accompanying text. See also Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 .(1995); Hallstrom v. Tillamook
County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 356-64
(Richard A. Epstein et al., eds., 2d ed. 1994). For a discussion of how the Court's statutory
construction doctrine has applied to interpreting a federal environmental statute, see infra notes 214-
27 and accompanying text.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). See also infra notes 264-97 and accompanyingtext;
Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10419.
81. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
82. For a discussion of the failure of a judicial resolution of § 6972(a)(l(B)'s problems, see
infra parts H.B., I.D., Il.E.
83. See infra section V.B.
84. See infra section V.
85. See infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 125-53 and accompanying text.
87. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). See also infra part IM.A.
88. 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995). See also infra part Il.C.
89. 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). See also infra part Im.E.
90. See infra parts M.B., HI.D, II.F.
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citizen suit provision to include a private restitution remedy. 9 In particular,
Section IV will compare the remedies for hazardous waste contamination
provided by RCRA's citizen suit provision with the remedial powers citizens
have under CERCLA, as well as identify the problems private parties have
obtaining common law tort remedies against parties responsible for
contamination.' Section V of this Note will propose an amendment to
RCRA's existing citizen suit provision that resolves the timing issue, allows for
restitution, provides a limitations period, supplies cost recovery guidelines,
eliminates the prohibition on private actions if the government is prosecuting an
action, and shortens the notice provision in the statute.' Revisions to RCRA's
citizen suit provision are critical. The only effective changes will be born from
congressional, rather than judicial, action.
II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ORIGINS OF RCRA SECTION 6972(A)(1)(B) AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF CITIZEN SUITS
Generally, RCRA, as well as the other federal environmental statutes, is
intended to "protect human health and the environment."' In particular,
Congress enacted RCRA95 to provide regulation of the continuous management,
transport, disposal, and general handling of hazardous and solid wastes."
Additionally, RCRA's enactment was intended to facilitate the prompt and
effective cleanup of environmental contamination in the form of solid and
hazardous wastes.' 7
In relevant part, section 6972(a)(1)(B), RCRA's citizen suit provision,
enables any citizen plaintiff to initiate a civil action against any operator of a
91. See infra section IV.
92. See infra part IV.A.
93. See infra section V.
94. Van der Reis, supra note 28, at 1269. See also H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 53 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5612.
95. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903-6972 (1988).
96. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)-(b) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 4 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6241. See also Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of
Hazardous Waste Laws and Its Effect on Tort Law and Practice, C427 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. 929, 932 (1989) ("RCRA establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme to manage
hazardous waste from its point of generation to its ultimate disposal."). RCRA's regulatory scheme
has three primary features:
(1) a permit system for hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities
implementing a complex body of intrusive and exacting standards; (2) a set of slightly
less stringent interim regulations governing the facilities until they are permitted; and
(3) a manifest system tracing hazardous wastes shipped from their point of origin to
their point of ultimate disposal.
Id.
97. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972-6973 (1988).
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facility' who is responsible for contributing, either in the past or currently, to
any hazardous or solid waste disposal that may give rise to "an imminent and
substantial endangerment" to human health, the environment, or both." Once
a plaintiff brings suit in the appropriate district court, the court has jurisdiction
to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present disposal of any solid or hazardous waste from further disposal and to
order such other action as may be necessary to remedy the problems, or
both.1m
A. History of RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B)
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA).' Included in that early enactment was section 6972, the harbinger
98. The term "facility" has a broad statutory explanation, as a result of not only its specific
definition, but also the way in which it combines with the term "disposal." See 42 U.S.C. §
6903(3), (29)(A)-(C) (1988). One of the statutory definitions of facility is: "[A]ny facility for the
• . . disposal of solid wastes, including hazardous wastes, whether such facility is associated with
facilities generating such wastes or otherwise." § 6903(29)(C) (emphasis added). See also Melissa
Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal Rights and Remedies Relating to Toxic Waste Dumps, 5
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 117 (1991) (noting the broad interpretation accorded the term "facility" by
courts). The statute also provides a liberal definition of the term "disposal":
'[D]isposal' means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such
solid . . . or hazardous waste ... may enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). See also Rita H. McMillen, Liability for "Passive" Disposal of
Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 260-61 (1993) (providing an
overview of the broad interpretation applied to the term "disposal"). In essence, practically any site
at which solid or hazardous wastes are present may be construed as a RCRA facility under the
statute's combination of the terms "facility" and "disposal."
99. The statute permits any person to: commence a civil action on his own behalf -
(1)(B) against any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency . . . and including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment ....
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988).
100. § 6972(a)(2). Specifically, the statute provides:
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the parties ... to restrain any person who has contributed or who
is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste . . . to order such person to take such other
action as may be necessary, or both ....
Id.
101. Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10408. See also ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 494 (3d ed. 1991).
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to RCRA's current citizen suit provision."°2 Congress modeled section 6972
after the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 and the 1972 amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).' °3 RCRA was to be used to allow
citizens to actively participate in environmental enforcement." °  Specifically,
Congress intended section 6972 to provide citizens with a way to ensure the
enforcement of RCRA requirements and regulations.'0
5
However, the legislative history of section 6972's early enactment reveals
its limited scope.'" Not until 1984 was RCRA's citizen suit provision
amended and given a more expansive role in environmental citizen
enforcement. 7 In 1984, Congress amended section 6972 with the Hazardous
102. See Robertson, supra note 30, at 10491. RCRA's original citizen suit provision provided:
(a) In General-Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation
of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which
has become effective pursuant to this Act; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such regulation or
order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty as the case
may be.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, 2825 (1976)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988)).
103. S. REP. No. 94-988, at 17-18 (1976). The House Report on RCRA is not as informative.
It merely outlines RCRA's citizen suit provision. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 69 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6245, 6307. For a Supreme Court discussion of the affinity
between the citizen suit provisions of the CAA and the FWPCA, see Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
104. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10491.
105. See S. REP. No. 94-988, at 18.
106. The Senate Report reflects these limitations by stating that § 6972 was "carefully restricted
to actions where violations of standards and regulations or a failure on the part of officials to
perform mandated actions is alleged." Id. An additional restriction on the use of § 6972 was posed
by the statute's notice provision. Id. This provision required the citizen plaintiff to supply the state
environmental agency and the EPA with notice of the intent to sue, so as to allow the government
an opportunity to take corrective action on the alleged violation prior to the bringing of the citizen
suit. Id.
107. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10412. Although § 6972(a)(l)(B) allows citizens a larger
role in compelling compliance with RCRA standards, its application, like that of its predecessor, is
somewhat restricted by the notice requirement that is found in § 6972(b)(2)(A). Id. at 10413. See
also Miller, supra note 96, at 940; infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
"Section 7002(b) imposes restrictions on the filing of citizen suits. These include a
requirement that citizens notify EPA, the state in which the violation occurred, and the alleged
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and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA).'01
HSWA permits citizens to take action to correct "imminent and substantial
endangerments" created by hazardous or solid waste contamination by seeking
relief against the responsible parties who produced the contamination.'
09
Courts have traditionally given the "imminent and substantial endangerment"
language a broad interpretation.' 0 In Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins,"'
a federal district court defined "endangerment" as a "threatened or potential
harm" that "does not require proof of actual harm. "2 The court stated that
finding "imminence" does not require proof that actual harm will occur
immediately, but rather that the risk of threatened harm is present, even if the
harm is not realized for years." 3 Lastly, the court indicated that the word
violator of the claims and wait a specified period of time before filing suit." Sullivan, supra note
28, at 10413. Under § 6972(b)(2)(A), citizen plaintiffs must wait 90 days after giving notice before
bringing suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B) to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. Miller,
supra note 96, at 940. The three month delay was instituted by Congress during HSWA's enactment
in 1984 as a means of appeasing a minority of legislators who opposed enlarging § 6972's scope to
include the authorization of citizen suits to abate endangerment. Id. at 940-41. From the notice
requirements included in the statute, it is apparent that the right of citizens to sue under §
6972(a)(1)(B) may only be exercised if the EPA fails to bring an action after receiving notice of the
alleged violation. Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10412.
108. BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 61, at 4.
109. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10412. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
110. Paul A. Dominick & Leon C. Harmon, Lender Limbo: The Perils of Environmental
Lender Liability, 41 S.C. L. REV. 855, 867 (1990).
111. [1993123 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20665 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 1993).
112. Id. at 20671. The court stated, "When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual
injury need ever occur." Id.
113. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit asserted that "imminence"
refers "to the nature of the threat rather than identification of the time when the endangerment
initially arose." United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213 (3d Cir. 1982). Perhaps more
significantly, comments in the legislative history of RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) state that "[i]mminence
in this section applies to the nature of the threat .... The section, therefore, may be used for
events which took place at some time in the past but which continue to present a threat to the public
health or the environment." STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITrEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION,
COMMYrTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Hazardous Waste
Disposal 32 (1979).
However, the United States Supreme Court's most recent declaration of the definition of
imminence is rather different. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (1996).
"An endangerment can only be 'imminent' if it 'threatens to occur immediately.. . ." Id. (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1245 (2d ed. 1934)). The
Court's adoption of this definition of "imminence" as applied to RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) will
likely narrow the way the term is defined in other environmental statutes. See John P. Zaimes,
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.: The Supreme Court Sends Some Clear Signals in a Succinct
Opinion, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: SUPERFUND 16, Apr. 1996, at 1. See also infra notes 337-40 and
accompanying text.
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"substantial" does not require the measuring of risk."4  Similarly, in Dague
v. City of Burlington,"5 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained
that RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) "is intended to confer upon the courts the
authority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate
any risk posed by toxic wastes.""i
One commentator argues that the authority citizens have been granted under
amended section 6972 is intended to be commensurate with the standards of
liability in RCRA section 6973."1 Section 6973 permits the EPA
Administrator to bring suit against alleged violators for past and present
endangerments."' When Congress amended section 6972 in 1984, it modeled
the amendments after the imminent and substantial endangerment precepts and
standards in RCRA section 6973.119 Consequently, the language governing the
scope of relief available to the government under section 6973 is very similar
to the language governing the scope of relief available to private party plaintiffs
under section 6972(a)(1)(B)." Section 6973's legislative history is often used
to interpret and illuminate section 6972(a)(1)(B)." Indeed, citizen plaintiffs'
powers under section 6972(a)(1)(B) had not been authoritatively defined until the
Supreme Court rendered its Meghrig decision, I" and even Meghrig fails to
114. Lincoln Properties, [1993] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20671. The court noted,
however, that "injunctive relief should not be granted 'where the risk of harm is remote in time,
completely speculative in nature, or de minimis in degree.'" Id. (citations omitted). See also Gache
v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("A violation of RCRA does not
mean that a permanent injunction necessarily follows." The plaintiff must still offer evidence of an
irreparable harm before an injunction will be issued.).
115. 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
116. Id. at 1355 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d
Cir. 1982)).
117. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10412.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988). In relevant part, § 6973 provides:
[U]pon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the [EPA]
Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district
court against any person . . .who has contributed or who is contributing to such
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take
such other action as may be necessary, or both.
§ 6973.
119. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5612.
120. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10492.
121. Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10413. The striking similarity betweenthe two provisions led
the Ninth Circuit to hold in KFC Western that the relief afforded citizens under section 6972(a)(1)(B)
is similar to the relief provided to the EPA under section 6973.
122. See Zaimes, supra note 113, at 1 (noting that in its unanimous Meghrig decision, the
United States Supreme Court resolved at least two significant issues involving the scope of RCRA's
citizen suit provision).
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fully define the statute's scope." 2  This lack of definition is problematic for
the increasing number of private plaintiffs who bring suit under this
provision.'" 4 However, the Court's narrow construction of RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B) seriously limits this citizen suit provision's effectiveness as a much
needed hazardous waste cleanup device.
B. The Importance of Citizen Suit Provisions in the Environmental Law
Framework
Identifying the scope of relief afforded citizen plaintiffs under RCRA
section 6972(a)(1)(B) is important because Congress has recently enacted
measures which limit the power of agency environmental protection.
125
Congress is implementing what has been dubbed an "anti-environmental"
agenda" by attempting to work the goals of this agenda into the federal
budget, appropriating less money to environmental preservation.' 27  The
congressional approach to environmental protection poses a significant reduction
in federal and state agency enforcement of environmental cleanup."z Not only
123. See infra notes 347-63 and accompanying text.
124. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1002.
125. John H. Cushman, EPA Forced to Curtail Pollution Inspections: Cost-conscious Congress
Eyes Deeper Funding Cuts, CouRIER J., Nov. 25, 1995, at IA. According to one commentator,
Americans are faced with the most anti-environmental Congress in recent memory [and a]
"Democratic president who has ... turned his back on nature." Tad Friend, We Few, We Happy
Few, We Band of Fledgling Monkeywrenchers Learning to Speak in Sound Bites, OUTSIDE, Oct.
1996, at 48.
126. Environment on Line Today as U.S. House Casts Vote On Saving Wetlands and Clean
Water Says Environmental Information Center, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 29, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter
Environment on Line] (labeling Congress' approach to the environment as an "anti-environmental"
agenda). See also Joseph Dlhopolsky, Our Own Waterworld, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at A29
(calling congressional initiatives "anti-environment" measures).
127. Environment on Line, supra note 126, at 1.
128. Cushman, supra note 125, at Al (discussing the consequences the EPA will suffer as a
result of funding cuts). For a discussion of how funding cuts to the EPA will hurt individual states,
see Mark Van Putten, EPA Funding Cuts Hurt Michigan, DET. NEWS, Nov. 3, 1995, at A12. One
commentator stated:
Cutting off federal funding . . . would hurt Michigan. It would block EPA's
partnership with the states to provide maximum flexibility in how the rules are
implemented and EPA's role in coordinating inter-state consistency. It would prohibit
EPA from giving technical assistance in the development of the required state standards,
help that the states are crying for.
Id. See also Bill Dawson, EPA Chief Browner Says Cuts in Funding Hit Texas Hard, Hous.
CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995, at 25 ("Texas would sustain a considerable impact from the EPA budget cuts
approved by Congress, including the loss of at least $59.6 million in funding that goes to state
agencies for projects including sewage treatment improvements and assistance in assuring the safety
of drinking water.").
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does Congress intend to cut funding to agency cleanup programs 129 such as
those that exist under RCRA and CERCLA,13° but it has also proposed
legislative initiatives that mark an era of less stringent regulations,"' causing
Americans and various environmental organizations to fear a variety of
uncontrolled environmental hazards. 132 Funding cuts have already forced the
129. Environment on Line, supra note 126, at 2. Proposed environmental amendments contain
a 25 % cut in the EPA's enforcement budget. Id. Even when environmental budgets for federal
programs are increased, the increases are not always sufficient to enable the agency to accomplish
the programs' objectives. This is because increases in program costs exceed increases in monies.
For example, existing national parks and visitor's centers around the country are facing enormous
budgetary problems despite numerous funding increases since the mid-1980s. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAo/RcED-95-238) NATIONAL PARKS: DIFFICULT CHOICES NEED TO BE
MADE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PARKS 38 (Aug. 1995). These problems may result in the
closure of certain national parks which are currently part of the national park program. Id.
130. The Superfund, which is administered by the EPA, is one of the nation's most important
remediation programs because it targets the nation's most hazardous toxic waste sites. U.S.
GENERALACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAo[RCED-95-259) SUPERFUND: OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
ACTIVITIES WILL REQUIRE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 7 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE]. The Superfund was established under the auspices of CERCLA in 1980 and is
composed of an 8.5 billion dollar fund that is used primarily for cleaning up abandoned hazardous
waste sites. Superfund is financed by three sources: 73% is generated by taxes levied on chemical
and petroleum affiliated businesses; 11 % comes from the United States Treasury's general fund; and
the remaining 16% relies on revenue from assessed penalties, recoveries, and interest earned on the
remainder of the Superfund. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-85-2) ILLEGAL
DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: DIFFICULT TO DETECT OR DETER 12 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter
ILLEGAL DISPOSAL].
131. Environment on Line, supra note 126, at 2 (explaining that a recent congressional bill calls
for weakened protection of wetlands, less funding for sewage treatment, less funding for drinking
water treatment, the continued existence of unregulated hazards in America's drinking water, a halt
to the EPA's survey of how America utilizes toxic chemicals, and a halt to cleanup of existing
Superfund sites, as well as a halt to listing additional Superfund sites). See also Glen Martin,
Environmentalists Fear Movement's ime Passing, HOUS. CHRON., June 4, 1995, at 22 ("In its first
100 days, the House enacted roles that would make it more difficult for the government to enforce
environmental regulations or restrict ecologically unsound activities on private property."). In May
of 1995, the House of Representatives approved modifications to the Clean Water Act that would
"strip protection for wetlands, make it easier for industries to pollute and require the government
to compensate landowners for financial losses if their properties receive wetland designation. And
legislation is advancing to sell off federal lands to help balance the budget." Id.
132. Bob Adler of the Natural Resources Defense Council voiced concern about several
proposed congressional revisions to portions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), "particularly [those
provisions] regarding efforts to protect citizens in urban areas, the likely sites of the greatest
pollution. 'They're often places where there are communities of color, who can't afford to go fish
in pristine trout streams in the mountains, but fish off the pier.'" Senate Subcommittee Completes
Work on Clean Water Bill, ENv'T WK., Feb. 3, 1994, at I [hereinafter Senate Subcommineel. A
national survey conducted by the EPA reports that an estimated 264 million metric tons of hazardous
waste are generated every year. Oppliger, supra note 26, at 65 n.29. Roughly 80% of such waste
is land disposed-that is, it is disposed of in surface impoundments, landfills, waste piles, lagoons,
and underground injection wells. Id. As a result of leaking pipelines, underground storage tanks,
areas of frequent spills, and treatment and holding ponds, disposal of hazardous waste often occurs
in places that are not designated as hazardous waste sites or licensed as RCRA facilities. See Angelo
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EPA to cancel hundreds of pending enforcement actions,133 which presents a
serious concern for the future of environmental protection." Furthermore,
congressional funding allotments to the EPA have remained almost constant
since 1980, 3s while the costs of agency protection of the environment have grown.
1 36
Berguson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and Its Impact on Business
Transactions, 8 CORP. L. GUIDE 101, 103 (1985).
According to the EPA, 73 million people live within four miles of at least one EPA designated
Superfund site, the most dangerous type of toxic waste site in the country. U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-95-205) SUPERFUND: INFORMATION ON CURRENT HEALTH RISKS
10 (July 1995) [hereinafter CURRENT HEALTH RISKS]. Currently, there is a great deal of concern
centered on the extent to which these sites pose risks of cancer and other conditions, including nerve
and liver damage and birth defects. Id. at 11. Although the sites are designated for cleanup by the
government, the EPA is unable to clean them rapidly. See infra note 136 (discussing the enormous
costs of remediating these sites and the span of years required to effectively monitor and control
them). The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the number of Superfund sites will grow
from 1100 to 4500 in the near future, and costs will soar commissurally. See CURRENT HEALTH
RISKS, supra, at 10.
133. Senate Subcommittee, supra note 132, at 1.
134. Babich & Hanson, supra note 65, at 10165.
135. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ET AL., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 337 (115th ed. 1995). Federal outlays in the millions of dollars to the EPA for fiscal years
1980, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 are, respectively, as follows: 5603, 5108, 5769, 5950,
5930, and 5855. Id. An estimated $6274 million was apportioned to the EPA for :,he 1995 fiscal
year. Id.
136. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/HR-95-12) HIGH RISK SERIES - SUPERFUND
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 3 (Feb. 1995) (noting the "escalating costs of hazardous waste cleanups
and growing constraints on federal resources"). See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
(GAo/HR-95-1) HIGH RISK SERIES - AN OVERVIEW 80 (Feb. 1995) ("Recent estimates indicate that
cleaning up the thousands of hazardous waste sites-many of which are owned by the federal
government-could result in over $300 billion in federal costs and many billions more in private
expenditures."). CERCLA's current Superfund cleanup docket alone has increased in cost by
billions of dollars. CURRENT HEALTH RISKS, supra note 132, at 10 ("Superfund cost estimates are
soaring. Although the Superfund program was authorized through 1994 at $15 billion covering more
than 1,100 nonfederal sites, these figures could rise to $75 billion and 4,500 nonfederal sites,
according to the Congressional Budget Office."). Another GAO report states that the EPA has
developed remedies to clean up 275 of the 1300 most hazardous waste sites in America.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, supra note 130, at 7. Although construction has been completed
at these sites, "additional activities, known as operations and maintenance, may be necessary" to
ensure that the remedy continues to function effectively and that the cleanup "protect[s] human
health and the environment." Id. The federal government, states, and responsible parties must
perform long-term operations and maintenance at nearly two-thirds of the 275 sites the GAO
reviewed. Id.
These activities ...will continue for decades and, in some cases, indefinitely. For
cleanup remedies that EPA or the responsible parties have already undertaken or will
undertake from now to fiscal year 2005, [the GAO] estimates that about $32 billion will
be needed for operations and maintenance costs nationwide through fiscal year 2040.
Id.
It is important to emphasize that the 32 billion dollar expenditure applies to the remediation
and continued monitoring of only 275 of the 1300 sites reviewed by the EPA. If this 32 billion
dollar price tag is reflective of prices in general for these types of environmental procedures, then
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Congress' anti-environmental legislative measures exist despite the fact that
the global population,'37 and Americans in particular,'" have demonstrated
a new awareness during the last three decades concerning the need to protect the
environment.' 39 This new awareness sparked a desire in Americans to protect
the environment and to ameliorate past deterioration. " A 1995 news poll
revealed that eighty-eight percent of Americans consider the issue of
environmental protection to be either "very important" or "one of the most
important problems" facing the nation. 4' Therefore, it is not surprising that
in lieu of the aforementioned "anti-environmental" legislative measures, the
private sector has an increasingly larger role to play in the facilitation of
environmental cleanup and preservation of the country. 42  One way
the remaining 1025 sites will cost many additional billions of dollars to clean up and maintain.
137. One international political coalition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
recently decided to "pool resources and improve cooperation to abate pollution, remediate existing
contaminationand conserve natural resources." ASEAN Growing Concern for Environment Prompts
Regional Cooperation, WORLD ENV'T REP., Oct. 26, 1994, at 1. The countries that comprise
ASEAN include Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Id. Due
to increased concern for environmental protection throughout Asia, the governments of ASEAN,
some of which are separated by wilderness and large expanses of water, are resolved that
transboundary pollution cleanup efforts will require regional cooperation. Id.
138. Dlhopolsky, supra note 126, at A29.
139. Van der Reis, supra note 28, at 1269. Humans are facing the reality that the environment
is fragile and potentially perishable. Id. See also Glen Martin & Marc Sandalow, Environmental
Movement in Despair, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 1995, at Al " [Diespite impressive past successes and
enduring citizen concern for the ecosphere... the new Republican-dominated Congress has taken
giant strides toward rolling back 25 years of bipartisan pro-environment legislation.").
140. Van der Reis, supra note 28, at 1269.
141. Martin & Sandalow, supra note 139, at Al (quoting the Time/CNN poll that conducted
the survey). "Donations to environmental and wildlife-preservation organizations rose by 12.5 %
[in current dollars], to 4 billion dollars. Such groups also saw a big jump in donations-I 1%-in
1994." John Murawski, A Banner Year for Giving: Donations Surge for Advocacy and
Environmental Organizations; Overseas-Aid Groups Take a Beating, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
May 30, 1996, at 1.
142. Budget statistics reveal the need for an integrated effort between the private and public
sectors to control pollution. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-88-101)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
THROUGH IMPROVED MANAGEMENT 36-37 (Aug. 1988). According to a GAO report, the EPA's
operating budget (in real terms) declined 15% from 1978 to 1987. Id. In that same period of time,
the federal budget increased by 248%. Id. As a result of a lack of resources and funds, the EPA
cannot address, let alone correct, all of the environmental contamination that currently exists. Id.
In one realm of environmental preservation, public participation in government efforts is
already underway:
South Florida-including the Everglades and Florida Bay . . . is showing signs of
ecological distress . . . . Federal agencies began an effort in 1993 to coordinate
environmental restoration in South Florida .... In addition, the administration has
identified South Florida as an appropriate site for testing a new approach to ensuring a
healthy environment and managing the nation's lands and natural resources ....
Central to this administration's new approach is the need for federal and nonfederal
stakeholders to collaborate and build consensus on solutions to problems or issues of
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individuals can compel environmental cleanup is through actions brought under
the various citizen suit provisions.'43
The Clean Air Act provided the first citizen suit provision in 1970."
Similar provisions are now found in all of the statutes which the EPA
administers. 4 5  During the 1970s, national environmental organizations'
used citizen suit provisions to sue the government to compel it to perform its
required obligations under the various environmental statutes. 47 In the 1980s,
plaintiffs who utilized the various citizen suit provisions still consisted almost
exclusively of national environmental groups; however, the groups' tactics
changed, and private industry was targeted for suit instead of the
government." 4
Today, citizen suits are brought in a variety of contexts by a diverse body
of plaintiffs,4 9 including private individuals.5" Furthermore, the EPA and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) have demonstrated consistent and powerful
support for the use of citizen suits as a means of supplemental enforcement to
mutual concern.
U.S. GOVERNMENT GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAo/HEHs/PEMD-95-202) RESTORING THE
EVERGLADES: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL EFFORTS 20-21 (Oct. 1995). The simple fact
is that supplemental citizen enforcement is critical to environmental protection and the abatement of
hazardous wastes. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-88-140), HAZARDOUS
WASTE: MANY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Do NOT MEET EPA STANDARDS 2 (June 1988)
[hereinafter EPA STANDARDS].
143. The utilization of citizen suit provisions for increased environmental protection is
preferable to the formation of groups such as Earth First!, an environmental organization that earned
the federal government's disfavor by using illegal means to prevent environmental destruction. See
Friend, supra note 125, at 53.
144. Miller, supra note 24, at 1001. Environmental statutes are not the only legislation in
which Congress enacted citizen suit provisions. Id. Citizen suit provisions are commonly found in
the social welfare statutes created in the 1970's. Id.
145. Id.
146. The environmental organizations that use citizen suit provisions as vehicles for litigation
include the National Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Defense Fund, and Sierra Club. See,
e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147. Miller, supra note 24, at 1002.
148. Id.
149. The standards governing a plaintiff's standing to sue under the environmental statutes'
citizen suit provisions were enunciated in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (holding that
plaintiffs who sue under a citizen suit provision must allege direct injury, and that it is not enough
that the plaintiff is a member of an organization which has public interest group status). See Miller,
supra note 24, at 1005 (noting that Sierra Club's tenets on citizen plaintiff's standing are still
controlling).
150. Miller, supra note 24, at 1005.
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government actions.' Due to the public availability of RCRA compliance
reports, and the fact that RCRA's authorization of citizen suits to abate imminent
and substantial endangerments has traditionally been a liberal standard, 52
citizen suits under section 6972(a)(1)(B) have increased.' 5 3
RCRA's citizen suit provision is potentially a very powerful enforcement
tool for citizens. However, the problems with utilizing the provision limit its
effectiveness and render its use by private parties difficult. An exploration of
two circuit courts' interpretations of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B), as well as an
analysis of a United States Supreme Court decision concerning RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B), will demonstrate thejudiciary's inability to adequately resolve the
statute's dilemmas.
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL RESOLUTION REGARDING SECTION 6972(A)(1)(B):
WHY IT Is DEFICIENT
Despite judicial attempts at interpretive resolutions of RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B), problems with the statute's vague language will remain. "
Because Congress did not expressly provide a private restitution cause of action
in RCRA, the statute lacks clear procedural and substantive guidelines.'
55
Judicial rulings which allow private litigants monetary relief will be limited to
particular circumstances, failing to create a uniform body of law. 'm As a
result, many unanswered questions will remain." 7 On the other hand, judicial
151. Id. at 1002.
152. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
153. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1002. See also Babich, supra note 27, at 10123 n. 16 (noting
the recent evolution of case law under § 6972(a)(1)(B)).
154. See infra parts Ill.B, HIM.D, I.F.
155. See infra part IH.B.2.
156. Specifically, judicial opinions will not address all of the possible factual permutations that
may arise. See generally infra parts U1I.B.2. and I.F. Therefore, judicial resolution of the
problems engendered by the current legal scheme of RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) will be piecemeal and
possibly inconsistent, depending on jurisdiction. See infra notes 252-63,347-67, and accompanying
text. Although the Supreme Court's Meghrig decision denies restitution as a remedy because the
plaintiff's suit was improperly commenced, the Court's opinion does not address whether a private
party may recover restitution under RCRA's citizen suit provision if suit has been properly brought.
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996) (stating that the Court's decision does
not determine that restitution is never an appropriate remedy under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)).
157. See infra notes 252-63, 347-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems
that will exist for plaintiffs and defendants in the wake of the Supreme Court's Meghrig decision,
see infra parts I.B, mI.D, I.F. If the Supreme Court's Meghrig opinion had affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's KFC Western decision, plaintiffs and defendants would still have faced numerous problems.
See infra part II.B.2. Furthermore, because Meghrig does not preclude restitution as an appropriate
remedy in every situation, litigants may still face the problems discussed in part III.B.2 of this note.
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opinions which deny restitutionI' will preclude a remedy for private plaintiffs
who have incurred costs by cleaning up contaminated property which they did
not pollute. 159
To deny restitution to private plaintiffs after the property contamination
ceases to present an imminent and substantial endangerment is unfair and
evidences poor public policy."6 However, to allow plaintiffs a remedy under
the current statute is contrary to statutory construction doctrine.16"'
Consequently, the problems existing in RCRA's citizen suit provisions cannot
be judicially resolved. 6 This is why courts which have ruled on section
6972(a)(1)(B) cases have not been able to satisfactorily settle the dilemmas
presented by the statute.' An analysis of the decisions handed down by the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eighth Circuits concerning
the scope of RCRA's citizen suit provision will provide an informative backdrop
for the United States Supreme Court's evaluation of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
in its Meghrig decision.
A. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig
Understanding the inadequacy of judicial resolution of the problems raised
by section 6972(a)(1)(B) requires an examination of the Ninth Circuit's KFC
Western decision. Although subsequently overruled,"' the Ninth Circuit's
holding evidences the policy and equity basis supporting an expansive
interpretation of RCRA's citizen suit provision.1 Current statutory
construction doctrine, however, requires that Congress amend RCRA's citizen
suit provision before a broad scope of judicial relief is afforded to private
plaintiffs by the statute.'"
In KFC Western, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal circuit to allow a private plaintiff to use RCRA section
158. Where plaintiffs seek reimbursement for past cleanup costs, courts must deny such relief
in light of Meghrig. For a discussion of Meghrig, see infra parts III.E-F.
159. See infra notes 292-93, 300-14 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
161. See generally infra part lII.B.1.
162. See infra parts IH.B, D, F.
163. See infra parts IH1B, D, F.
164. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996).
165. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of Meghrig, the Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning the
scope of § 6972(a)(1)(B), see infra parts IM.E-F.
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6972(a)(1)(B) for restitution of environmental response costs.' 67 Several other
federal courts have addressed the scope of RCRA's citizen suit provision.
I68
However, most of these courts have held that RCRA's citizen suit provision is
not an appropriate vehicle for a private restitution cause of action."6 In
reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' KFC Western holding, the
Supreme Court determined that restitution was an unsuitable remedy under the
facts of the case at issue, but refrained from holding that restitution may never
be awarded under the statute."T
The Ninth Circuit's KFC Western decision addressed several areas of
conflict presented by section 6972(a)(1)(B). First, the court concluded that an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" need not exist at the time that an
167. Fung, supra note 38, at 786. Before the KFC Western decision, many practitioners
believed that only injunctive relief was available to private plaintiffs under RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B).
Robertson, supra note 30, at 10491.
168. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the first federal circuit court to
specifically consider whether a private damages cause of action may be implied under RCRA §
6972(a)(l)(B). Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985). The Walls court
held that no such remedy exists, either expressly or implicitly. Id. at 316. Similarly, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested in dicta that permitting plaintiffs a private cause
of action for damages is inappropriate. Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331,
337 (4th Cir. 1983).
A host of federal district courts have also entertained the problem of defining the scope of
RCRA's citizen suit provision. Most have denied restitution to private plaintiffs. See generally
Agricultural Excess and Surplus Ins. Co. v. A.B.D. Tank & Pump Co., No. 95-C3681, 1996 WL
11122, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1996) (considering the issue of who qualifies as a "contributor"
under § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Mavigliano v. McDowell, No. 93-C7216, 1995 WL 704391, at *5-6 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 28, 1995) (holding that because the contaminated site had not been cleaned at the time suit
was brought and because plaintiff only sought injunctive relief, the court had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case); Portsmouth Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apartments
Assocs., 847 F. Supp. 380, 385 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that RCRA's citizen suit provision does
not authorize an award of money damages for remedial costs, response costs, or the costs of
investigation); Kaufman & Broad-South Bay, Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 822 F. Supp. 1468, 1477
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (denying a private party's request for restitution under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B));
Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("RCRA does not authorize
a plaintiff in a citizen suit to recover remediation costs."); Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone,
749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (permitting injunctive relief under the statute, but denying
a private action for damages); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990)
(refusing to award money damages to private plaintiffs for medical monitoring costs under §
6972(a)(1)(B)). An Arizona district court decision, which was handed down prior to the KFC
Western opinion, permits private plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action for restitution. Bayless Inv.
& Trading Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1428, 1431 (D. Ariz. May 26,
1994).
169. See supra note 168. Of course, the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's KFC
Western decision has definitively limited the scope of RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B). See infra part HLI.E.
170. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996). See also infra notes 347-
54 and accompanying text.
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action is filed. 7 ' Second, the court held that section 6972(a)(1)(B) authorizes
a private plaintiff restitution of cleanup costs, rather than solely injunctive
relief.'" The court stated that the primary issue was whether section
6972(a)(1)(B) empowers a private plaintiff to collect restitution for the cost of
remediating contaminated property.'"
1. Section 6972(a)(1)(B)'s Imminent Hazard Authority-The Timing of the
Action
To determine available relief, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first
examined the timing question presented by RCRA's citizen suit provision: 74
whether an "imminent and substantial endangerment" must exist either at the
time that a private plaintiff files a complaint or at the time of the cleanup of the
property.' 75 The court examined the language of United States v. Aceto
Agriculture Chemical Corp.,176 which addressed the scope of relief under
section 6973." The court found that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit awarded relief to the EPA pursuant to section 6973 when the
Administrator's suit was filed after the imminent and substantial endangerment
existed.7" The KFC Western court stated that to mandate that the EPA file
and prosecute its section 6973 action while the endangerment continues to exist
would be an "absurd and unnecessary" requirement.'79 The court concluded
that Congress intended that imminent hazard authority of both the government
and citizens be ruled by the same standards.'8s According to the court,
requiring citizens to file and prosecute restitution actions during the existence of
the imminent and substantial endangerment would defeat the purpose of the
statute, since a party only seeks restitution after remediating the property and
171. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1251 (1996).
172. Id. at 524.
173. Id. at 520.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 520-21.
176. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
177. For a discussion of § 6973, the government's imminent hazard provision, see supra notes
118-21. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988).
178. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1995) rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1251 (1996). See also Brief for Respondent at *5, 1996 WL 728551, Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83). But see Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1101 (8th Cir.
1995) (stressing that inAceto and NEPACCO, the issue of whether § 7003 authorizes courts to award
restitution to the government was not raised sua sponte or by the parties. Instead, the Aceto and
NEPACCO courts assumed "subject matter jurisdiction sub silentio" and dealt with the merits of the
EPA's claims for relief).
179. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 521 (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872
F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989)).
180. Id.
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eliminating the endangerment.'
2. The Relief Afforded Plaintiffs under RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B)
After resolving the timing issue, the KFC Western court addressed the relief
afforded by RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B).'" The court looked to analogous
section 6973 decisions in United States v. Aceto Agriculture Chemical
Corp.,"'3  United States v. Northeastern Pharmacy and Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO),'8  and United States v. Price."s The KFC Western court
ascertained that in these decisions restitution was awarded to the EPA pursuant
to section 6 9 7 3 .1s6
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). In Aceto, the court permitted the EPA Administrator to
recover restitution pursuant to § 6973. Id. at 1383. However, a later panel of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals asserted that because the Aceto court assumed, without actually determining, that
the court had jurisdiction to award the EPA restitution under RCRA § 6973, Aceto is not stare
decisis on the issue. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1101 (8th Cir. 1995). See also KFC Western,
49 F.3d at 524 n.1, 525. (Brunetti, J., dissenting) ("[Blecause Aceto does not address the issue of
reimbursement, I do not believe that the majority should rely on it to include actions for restitution
within the scope of § 6972(a)(1)(B).").
184. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing the lower court to grant an equitable award of
cleanup costs from the responsible parties, although the government had remediated the property
prior to bringing suit). But see Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101 (claiming that NEPACCO is not stare
decisis on the scope of relief afforded under § 6973, since the panel deciding the case simply
assumed, without deciding, that the federal courts have jurisdiction under RCRA § 6973 to provide
the EPA restitution for cleanup costs expended remediating contaminated property).
185. 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that the EPA could recover a money award from
liable parties as restitution for the costs of funding a diagnostic study of contaminated property).
186. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518,522 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996). It can be argued, however, that the court misplaced its reliance on the decisions of other
federal circuit courts. For a discussion of the shortcomings associated with the KFC Western court's
reliance on the two Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals' decisions, see supra notes 183-84. See also
Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1100 (stressing that careful analysis of the case law relied upon by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals fails to support the court's decision).
The KFC Western court's failure in relying on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' § 6973
decision in United States v. Price is threefold. First, in the Price opinion, the circuit court noted
that at the time of the district court's hearing the contaminated property threatened imminent danger.
Price, 688 F.2d at 214. Second, the Price court affirmed the district court's holding, which denied
the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to fund a diagnostic study
of the contaminated property. Id. In dicta, the circuit court noted that the district court could have
ordered an immediate injunction or could have allowed the EPA to fund a study and later recover
reimbursement for this activity, but it did not mandate or fully explore either course of action. Id.
Finally, the KFC Western court's "smorgasbord-style use of the Price decision-picking and
choosing the portions of Price that supported its holding while leaving behind the contradictory
parts-seriously undermines its credibility." Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10419. See also infra note
193 and accompanying text.
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The majority noted that the language of section 6972(a)(1)(B) is
substantially similar to the language of section 6973." Persuaded by the
analogous decisions of its sister circuits and by the virtually identical language
of section 6972(a)(1) and section 6973, the majority chose to interpret the
provisions as providing similar relief"1s According to the KFC Western court,
RCRA's goal is to "give broad authority to the courts to grant all relief
necessary to ensure complete protection of the public health and the
environment. " 89
In addition to finding that restitution is available to citizen plaintiffs by
analogy to section 6973, the KFC Western court also found a statutory basis for
relief. " Examining the broad language of section 6972(a)(1)(B)," the
court stated that restitution falls within RCRA's statutory allowance of
relief. " Specifically, the majority focused on the language of section
6972(a)(1) which permits district courts to order defendants to take "such other
action as may be necessary."" 9  The court flatly rejected the argument that
RCRA's citizen suit provision permits only injunctive relief or other non-
monetary equitable relief."9
After finding that RCRA's citizen suit provision allows restitution, the KFC
Western court declined to hold that differences in the notice provisions of
sections 6972 and 6973 indicate that restitution should only be awarded to the
EPA Administrator.' 95 Despite the court's acknowledgement that Congress
187. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 521. See also Brief for Respondent at *4, 1996 WL 728551,
Meghrig v. KFC Western Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83).
188. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 522.
189. Id. at 521 (quoting United Statesv. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th
Cir. 1989)).
190. Id.
191. To peruse the relevant statutory language of the citizen suit provision in § 6972(a)(1)(B),
see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
192. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996).
193. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)). The court indicated that this language furnished a
statutory basis for granting restitution. Id. However, the court failed to cite any legislative history
in support of its conclusion. Id. The court relied on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' Price
decision as support for its conclusion. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. Yet, the
Price court "quoted legislative history that specifically contradicted the [KFC Western] majority's
interpretation of this phrase." Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10419. The legislative history noted by
the Price court indicates that the phrase "was intended to authorize both short- and long-term
injunctive relief." Id.
194. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 521.
195. Id. at 522. The court also distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Id. at 522 n.5. In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court
rejected a statutory interpretation that would render a statutory notice provision gratuitous. Gwaltney
of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). A basic purpose of the notice
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specified a limitations period in CERCLA," the court rejected the defendants'
contention that the lack of a limitations period suggests that Congress did not
intend that section 6972(a)(1)(B) be used to obtain restitution.197
The KFC Western court's holding largely rests on policy justifications."se
The court found that CERCLA and state law remedies fail to provide an
adequate substitute source of relief for "innocent" plaintiffs like KFC.'" In
addition, the court stated that it is even more important that section
6972(a)(1)(B) provide private plaintiffs, rather than the government, restitution,
since private citizens cannot control the timing of government cleanup orders
and often fall victim to such orders before being able to file and prosecute an
action against the parties actually responsible for contaminating the
property.I
The KFC Western decision stresses that private plaintiffs should not be
required to bring suit during the existence of an imminent and substantial
endangerment under section 6972(a)(1)(B). The KFC Western decision also
emphasizes the logic and equity of permitting restitution awards to private
plaintiffs under the statute. However, the KFC Western decision's attempt to
resolve the problems in RCRA's citizen suit provision is inadequate.
requirements in the environmental statutes is to provide an alleged violator of a statute the chance
to modify his or her behavior so as to comply with the applicable statutory requirements. Id. at 60.
Such compliance obviates the need for the bringing of a citizen suit. Id. For a detailed discussion
of the Gwaltney case, see Jeffrey G. Miller, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc.: Invitation to the Dance of Litigation, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10098
(1988). The KFC Western court stated that Gwalney's analysis was not determinative because
Gwaltney dealt with a different statute's citizen suit provision, one which pertains only to persons
alleged to be in current violation of federal requirements. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 522 n.5.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d)(1) (1988).
197. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 522. The defendants focused their argument on the notion that
the lack of a limitations period in the statute engenders problems because it leaves citizens free to
file suits for monetary recovery many years after the imminent endangerment is eliminated through
remediation. Id. The court responded to this argument by claiming that an equitable doctrine such
as the common law theory of laches would suffice to alleviate any unfairness created by the lack of
a limitations period. Id.
198. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518,523 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996). The court claimed:
It would be unfair and poor public policy to interpret § 6972(a)(l)(B) as barring
restitution actions. By doing so, we would make the citizen suit remedy meaningless
in most cases for the very citizens who most deserve the remedy, namely innocent
citizens... who have a financial stake in the contaminated property as well as potential
and actual clean-up liability.
Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 524.
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B. .Deficiencies of the KFC Western Holding
Some legal analysts received the KFC Western decision with
enthusiasm." However, other members of the legal community are doubtful
that Congress ever intended private parties to use RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
to obtain post-cleanup restitution.' As evidenced by its reversal of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' KFC Western holding, the United States Supreme
Court is one such skeptic.' Although the KFC Western decision produces a
seemingly equitable result, it raises several irreconcilable issues.'
1. The KFC Western Court's Failure to Follow Firmly Established Supreme
Court Doctrine
One irreconcilable issue is that the KFC Western court failed to apply well-
defined United States Supreme Court statutory construction doctrine 5 in its
analysis of whether RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) permits restitution.' The
201. See Robertson, supra note 30, at 10492 ("The [KFC Western] decision confirmed that §
7002(a)(1)(B) can be a powerful and remarkably effective remedy for private parties to use in
shifting the burden of response to parties responsible for contaminating property."). Another
commentator concluded:
The KFC Western decision to pr6vide restitution under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)
strengthens the ability of citizens to supplement government enforcement of the solid and
hazardous waste enforcement schemes of RCRA and CERCLA, addresses several
unsatisfactory aspects of the previously existing state of RCRA-CERCLA law, and
produces a fair and equitable result.
Fung, supra note 38, at 841.
202. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10413 ("Congress did not intend to authorize a private
cause of action for damages under RCRA . . .good environmental litigation planning can keep a
property owner out of the difficult position of seeking cost recovery under a statute that does not
provide such relief."). See also Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that
RCRA's citizen suit provision precludes an award of restitution to a private plaintiff).
203. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996). The Supreme Court did not hold
that restitution is never afforded under the statute. Id. at 1256. See also infra notes 347-67 and
accompanying text.
204. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10418 (specifying various problems with the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in KFC Western).
205. The Supreme Court's statutory construction doctrine has evolved steadily over the last
several decades. However, a detailed analysis of this evolution falls outside of the scope of this
note, as does an in-depth examination of current Supreme Court doctrine. For a closer look at
Supreme Court case law on the issue of statutory construction and the treatment of implied causes
of action, see Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114
S. Ct. 1439 (1994); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); United States v. Ron Pair
Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am.,
AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 79, at 356-64.
206. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10418.
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statute clearly allows a private cause of action for injunctive relief; however, the
narrower question is whether it allows private restitution when suit is brought
in the absence of an imminent and substantial endangerment. In Meghrig, the
Supreme Court denied restitution under such circumstances.'" The Court's
reading of RCRA's citizen suit provision in Meghrig is hardly surprising in lieu
of its long-standing doctrine. The Court has stated that the question of whether
a private cause of action exists is essentially one of statutory construction.0
The Court is extremely reluctant to find that Congress implied a private cause
of action.' The Supreme Court requires an affirmative indication of
Congress' intent to provide a private cause of action.211 In the absence of
plain language expressing a private cause of action, courts diligently search for
evidence of congressional intent to imply a private cause of action by examining
the statute's legislative history.2" ' Courts may compare related statutes with
the statute in question to detect congressional intent.21 2 Finally, if a court is
207. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1256.
208. See, e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688; Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 568; Northwest
Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91.
209. In Cannon, Justice Rehnquist essentially put Congress on notice that the Supreme Court
is disinclined to imply private causes of action where Congress' intent is unclear on the face of the
statute. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (expressing that the Supreme Court
was "appris[ing] the lawmaking branch... that the ball, so to speak, may well now be in its court"
and that "this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent
... specificity on (the part of the Legislative Branch")).
210. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 79, at 361. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 ("The
ultimate question .. .is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy ... that the
plaintiff seeks to invoke."). See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717. The Court stated that "[w]hen Congress
intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better
course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights." Id. Only when "all of the
circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are
present" will the Court imply a private cause of action. Id. According to the Court, the appearance
of all of these required circumstances is rare; indeed, it is the "atypical situation." Id. The majority
warned that "implying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous
enterprise, at best." See also Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 571. For an argument that the
Court's intent analysis is myopic because intent can be difficult to discern, see generally Joyce
Yeager, Note, No Remedy for Lust: An Implied Cause of Action and RCRA, 64 UMKC L. REV.
637, 648 (1996).
211. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-83 (1975) (requiring an examination of the statute's
legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to vest in a plaintiff a federal right to
damages); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(stating that the federal courts "must surely look to .. .[federal] laws to determine whether there
was an intent to create a private right of action under them"). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted: "'Even settled rules of statutory construction could yield, of course, to persuasive evidence
of a contrary legislative intent.'" Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979)).
212. For example, to determine whether to infer an implied cause of action in a statute, the
Supreme Court examined express causes of action in related statutes. See Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994) (noting that if Congress had enacted a private cause
of action in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, "it likely would have designed it in a manner
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unable to find support for implying a private cause of action, it may not amend
federal schemes "by adding to them another private remedy not authorized by
Congress. "2 "
The Court's reluctance to imply private causes of action applies in the
realm of federal environmental law. In California v. Sierra Club,"4 as well
as in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 215 the Court refused to imply private rights of action2la under the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 189927 (Rivers and Harbors Act)
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).21 1 In Sierra Club, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that private plaintiffs who suffer injuries
from unauthorized activities that interfere with the navigability of the country's
waterways may sue not only to enforce the Rivers and Harbors Act's permit
requirements, but may sue for damages as well. 219 The circuit court permitted
this relief despite acknowledging that neither the language of the Act nor its
legislative history clearly indicated that Congress intended to provide
damages.' The court reasoned that allowing a private cause of action for
damages would facilitate supplementary enforcement of the Act and was
consonant with the Act's goals?'
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, refusing to imply a private cause of action for damages under
the statute.' Significantly, the Court reproached the circuit court for failing
to consider both the language and legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors
Act.' The Court specified that the most important issue in deciding whether
similar to the other private rights of action in the securities Acts"); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993) (stating that the purpose of examining express
causes of action in related statutes is "to attempt to infer how... Congress would have addressed
the issue" if it had intended to create an express cause of action). See also Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 93-94 (1981) ("The comprehensive character
of the remedial scheme expressly fashioned by Congress strongly evidences an intent not to authorize
additional remedies.').
213. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94.
214. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
215. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
216. Georgene M. Vairo, Selected Problems in Federal Jurisdiction: Standing, Implied Rights
of Action, Pendent Jurisdiction, and Abstention, C607 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
363, 375 (1991).
217. 33 U.S.C. § 402 (1899).
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1972). See also supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
219. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 592 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub. nom. California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
220. Id. at 587.
221. Id.
222. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981).
223. Id. at 294.
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a private cause of action shall be implied is Congress' intent to create or deny
such a right.' Using the test in Cort v. Ash' to discern congressional
intent,2 ' the Court held that the language of the Act and its legislative history
failed to support a judicial finding of an implied private cause of action. M
Apparently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not learn a
lesson from the Court's decision in Sierra Club.' The KFC Western court's
failure to follow well-established Supreme Court guidelines is evidenced by the
fact that, in analyzing RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B), the court neither employed
224. Id.
225. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Con test in relevant part provides:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted'-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in
an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). Professor Chemerinsky, an expert on issues of federal jurisdiction,
notes that although Corr has not been expressly discarded, the Supreme Court has departed from the
Con methodology, replacing it with an even stricter formulation. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 79,
at 361. Justices Scalia and O'Connor stated that they believe that the Corr analysis has been
.effectively overruled." Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
The most current "test" regarding implied private causes of action is found in Central Bank
v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). This new approach has been branded a "strict
textualism" analysis. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 13, 14 (1995).
Essentially, the majority in Central Bank-Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist-held that a determination of whether private plaintiffs have an implied cause of
action is to be resolved by a literal reading of the statute. Id. at 20 (c;ting Central Bank, 114 S. Ct.
at 1446-48). The Central Bank Court stated that "the text of the statute controls our decision."
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446. But see Eisenberg, supra, at 14 (arguing that strict textualism
is "intellectually incoherent" and "institutionally impermissible, because judges have an obligation
to be faithful servants of the legislature, and the use of strict textualism violates this obligation").
Under an approach of strict textualism, the Court only considers the language of the statute in its
literal sense, refusing to consider legislative history or the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme. Id. at 13 (explaining that under a strict textualist test, "all elements outside the relevant
canonical text-for example, the historical condition, that gave rise to the statute, and propositions
of policy, morality, and experience that provide the social context of the statute or otherwise bear
on its subject matter-are inadmissible").
226. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293. Specifically, the Court examined only the first and second
Coil factors to make its determination. Id. at 297. The Court explained that the third and fourtlh
Coil factors are only applied if the first two factors produce evidence of congressional intent, whicl
was not the case here. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10418.
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formal statutory construction tests, nor cited to Supreme Court precedent.'
Instead, the court quoted some of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)'s language and
considered portions of its legislative history,' conceding that the legislative
history actually supported the defendants' arguments and undermined the court's
holding." Because the court failed to find the requisite congressional intent
to create a private damages cause of action in either the language or legislative
history of RCRA's citizen suit provision, it should have ceased its inquiry and
affirmed the district court's holding.2
However, in clear contravention of Supreme Court precedent, the KFC
Western court continued its analysis of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B).23
Specifically, the court examined other circuit court cases on section 6973,23
as well as the public policy implications of allowing restitution under RCRA's
citizen suit provision.3 5  Based on these considerations, the court ruled that
RCRA's citizen suit provision permits an award of private restitution when suit
is brought in the absence of an imminent and substantial endangerment.' In
reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sierra Club, the Supreme Court
stressed that if a finding of congressional intent to create a private cause of
action is absent in the statute's language and legislative history, other issues and
considerations are irrelevant."' Therefore, the underpinnings of the KFC
229. See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996). See also Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10419 ("The majority's analysis of § 7002 consisted
of little more than quoting of some of § 7002 and italicizing some of the key phrases in the
dispute.").
230. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 520-21 n.3. While the KFC Western court's examination of
statutory language and legislative history would seem consistent with statutory construction doctrine,
the court did not follow established case methodology or inquiries in its examination. See Sullivan,
supra note 28, at 10419.
231. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 522 n.3 ("The House Committee... explained in its report that
citizens have [merely] a limited right to sue .... [T]he legislative history cuts both ways because
• . . [some of the] language supports the Meghrigs' contention that Congress intended to allow
citizens to sue only for injunctions when it added the endangerment provision."). Earlier in the text
of the opinion, the KFC Western majority made similar concessions: "The result urged by the
Meghrigs is supported by certain comments in the legislative history that explain the meaning of the
term 'imminence.'" Id. at 520.
232. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10419.
233. Id.
234. From examining these cases, the KFC Western court drew an analogy between RCRA §§
6972(a)(1)(B) and 6973 for its holding. For a discussion of the analogy between § 6972(a)(l)(B)
and § 6973 used by the KFC Western court, see supra notes 174-89 and accompanying text. See
also Fung, supra note 38, at 801-02.
235. For a discussion of the KFC Western majority's reliance on public policy as a basis for
allowing a private cost recovery claim under RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B), see supra notes 198-200 and
accompanying text.
236. See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1251 (1996).
237. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981).
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Western decision are faulty. If the KFC Western court had followed the
Supreme Court's teachings in Sierra Club, it would have held that Congress did
not intend private restitution to be awarded under RCRA 6972(a)(1)(B).238
2. Lack of Resolution of Statutory Ambiguities and Deficiencies
Thus, even though the KFC Western court's decision provides plaintiffs
restitution, it is contrary to Supreme Court doctrine regarding statutory
interpretation, which is why the decision was unable to survive the Court's
scrutiny 39  Further, even if the Court had affirmed the KFC Western
decision, the decision fails to adequately address ambiguities in the statute which
pose problems for both plaintiffs and defendants.' ° Although the Supreme
Court's decision in Meghrig does not permit post-cleanup restitution, it does not
recognize a wholesale preclusion of the award of restitution under the
statute. 24 1 Consequently, in cases where restitution is considered an
appropriate remedy, the last two problem areas identified in this section will
remain troublesome for litigants.42
One glaring deficiency in implying a private cause of action for restitution
under section 6972(a)(1)(B) is the lack of a statute of limitations period. 4 3
This deficiency would allow private parties to sue long after the discovery and
cleanup of contamination. 2" Furthermore, the lack of a limitations period,
while clearly unfair to defendants who could be dragged into court unexpectedly,
is a boon to every citizen plaintiff that has been barred from the federal courts
by CERCLA's petroleum exemptionA5 or who is estopped from suing under
common law remedies because of expired state limitations periods.2"
238. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10419.
239. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254, 1256 (1996). See also Brief
for the Petitioners at *23-25, 1995 WL 668003, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. 1251,
(1996) (No. 95-83) (discussing generally the provisions of § 6972(a)(1)(B) which are incompatible
with a Supreme Court affirmation of the existence of an implied private cause of action for
restitution).
240. See Petitioner's Brief at *23-25, KFC Western (No. 95-83).
241. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1256.
242. Specifically, the lack of a statutory burden of proof scheme for the validity of response
costs, as well as the lack of guidance for the appropriateness of response costs sought to be
recovered, will remain problematic for litigants. See infra notes 359-60, 364-65 and accompanying
text.
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988). See also Petitioner's Brief at *23-24, KFC Western
(No. 95-83).
244. Petitioner's Brief at *24, KFC Western (No. 95-83).
245. For a discussion of CERCLA's petroleum exemption, see infra notes 386-87 and
accompanying text.
246. See Brief for Petitioner at *24, 1995 WL 668003, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 116
S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83).
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Virtually all of these types of plaintiffs will proceed to federal court to litigate
their claims under RCRA's citizen suit provision.24'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized these potential problems in
its KFC Western decision, but did not adequately address them.2 The court's
solution was to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to eviscerate any
unfairness that the lack of a limitations period might create. 9 However, the
doctrine of laches is indefinite and cannot serve as a suitable substitute for a
definitive limitations period in the statute.' Therefore, if RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B) is interpreted to allow awards of private restitution, the statute
must be revised to include a limitations period."l
Another problem posed by the existing statute that would become
monumental if citizen plaintiffs were entitled to use RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
to recover restitution is the lack of a statutory standard to determine the
appropriateness of costs.Y2 Under CERCLA, the response costs incurred by
plaintiffs must be "necessary and consistent" with the National Contingency
Plan 3 (NCP) to be recoverable." 1  Nowhere in RCRA does the statute
provide guidance similar to that in CERCLA for plaintiffs or defendants . 55
This is a significant obstacle for RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) litigants.2 6 One
247. Id.
248. See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1251 (1996).
249. Id.
250. See Petitioner's Brief at *24, KFC Western (No. 95-83). If laches were to have applied
anywhere, it would have applied in KFC Western, since the last waste disposal occurred in the early
1960's, roughly 35 years prior to the decision. See id. at *4. The court merely paid lip service to
laches. However, even if laches were applied, it could produce inconsistent decisions by the courts.
A great deal of time and judicial energy would be spent before a consistent application of the
doctrine of laches was produced.
251. See infra part V.
252. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988). See also Petitioner's Brief, at *24-25, KFC
Western (No. 95-83).
253. The NCP is comprised of a 29 page breakdown of regulations on "hazardous substance
response" in the Code of Federal Regulations. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400-300.440(1988). Parties who
incur response costs remediating contaminated property may receive guidance from the NCP as to
which costs will be recoverable from responsible parties in a subsequent CERCLA suit. See id.
254. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(E) (1988).
255. See generally id. §§ 6901-6981.
256. Plaintiffs will enter the suit "blind" so to speak, uncertain as to which of their response
costs will be recoverable. Similarly, defendants will be equally uncertain as to which of the
plaintiff's response costs they will have to pay. Additionally, the litigants will be subject to the
determinations of the court in which the suit is being litigated. Thus, the federal courts will be
compelled to engage in "extensive interstitial lawmaking to define which costs are recoverable in
this highly technical area." Brief for Petitioner at *25 n. 11, 1995 WL 668003, KFC Western, Inc.
v. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83). See also BArLE & LIPLFS, supra note 61, at
7 (noting the complexities of the RCRA scheme and how difficult they are to master). Simply
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commentator argues that RCRA's citizen suit provision permits recovery of any
response costs which are "reasonable." 7 However, a requirement that costs
be "reasonable" provides little comfort for litigants, since federal judges may
struggle to formulate what "reasonable" is in RCRA's quagmire of highly
technical determinations and reach conflicting resultsYm  Therefore, the
current statutory framework engenders the possibility that a plaintiff will expend
more money than is necessary to remediate a site and that the defendant will
have to pay for the excess unless she or he can show that the plaintiff s costs are
unreasonable. 9
Another issue raised by the KFC Western decision concerns which party
will carry the burden of proof for the validity of response costs. Under
CERCLA's statutory scheme, but not under RCRA's, a clear statement
regarding the burdens of proof for the appropriateness of response costs is
provided.'°  In essence, CERCLA's provisions provide that when the
government is seeking recovery of response costs, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to show that such costs are inconsistent with the NCP.2 1  In
contrast, when a private party plaintiff seeks reimbursement for response costs,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that his expenses are consistent
with the NCP.2' Although courts can determine distribution of proof burdens
without great difficulty, a statutory scheme would simplify the process and
produce consistent judicial outcomes. w
The lack of a statutory burden of proof scheme for the validity of response
costs, as well as the lack of a guide for the appropriateness of response costs
sought to be recovered, indicate the need for a statutory amendment to section
6972(a)(1)(B). They also reflect the lack of resolution provided by either the
Meghrig or KFC Western courts to the problems raised by RCRA's citizen suit
provision. Similarly, the lack of a limitations period in section 6972(a)(1)(B)
merely serves to emphasize the inadequacy of the KFC Western decision.
defining what qualifies as RCRA hazardous waste, let alone measuring the appropriateness of
remediation costs for that waste, is extremely difficult. See id.
257. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10495.
258. See Petitioner's Brief at *25 n.11, KFC Western (No. 95-83). See also Randolph L. Hill,
An Overview of RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental
Statute, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10254 (May 1991) (describing RCRA's perplexing
complexities).
259. Yet, a determination of reasonableness may be faulty at best in the exceedingly complex
game of response cost valuation. See Petitioner's Brief at *25 n.1 1, KFC Western (No. 95-83).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988). See also generally id. §§ 6901-6981.
261. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
262. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
263. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B).
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C. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: Furrer v. Brown
The KFC Western opinion may seem to present sound public policy
arguments for allowing a private cause of action for restitution under RCRA's
citizen suit provisions.' Yet, some legal experts have noted the substantively
erroneous legal foundations of the decision.' In addition to at least one
commentator, a consensus of courts have stated that RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
does not support a private remedy for post-cleanup restitution. 2' In Furrer
v. Brown, 2' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the majority of federal
courts in denying restitution for cleanup costs to private plaintiffs under RCRA's
citizen suit provision.2' Although consonant with statutory construction
doctrine, the Furrer decision is inadequate because of the unfairness that results
from it.' "
In Furrer, owners of land contaminated by petroleum discovered the
contamination when they were ordered to remediate the property by a state
environmental agencyY After responding to the state cleanup order, the
Furrers sought to recover their remediation costs by suing the prior owners of
the land.. under RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B). 2  The district court held
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Furrer's suit and granted the
prior owners' motion to dismiss the case.2'
Applying Supreme Court statutory construction doctrine, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower court. 274 The
Eighth Circuit stated that under RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B), the federal courts
are given subject matter jurisdiction to hear citizen suits where plaintiffs seek
264. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
265. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10418-20. See also Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1100
(8th Cir. 1995) ("We think . . . that the court began with a questionable proposition and then
mistakenly reached its result in reliance on cases from this Circuit that, when carefully analyzed, do
not support the KFC Western decision.").
266. See supra note 168. See also Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10408.
267. 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
268. Id. at 1101-02.
269. See infra part M.D.
270. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093. Leaking underground gasoline storage tanks contaminated the
land. See id. at 1095.
271. The Browns and the Fagases were the prior owners of the property. Furrer, 62 F.3d at
1093. The Furrers also sued Shell Oil Company, which at one time had leased the property and
operated a service station on it. Id.
272. Id. The Furrers also brought suit under three state common law claims. Id. The Furrers
were precluded from suing under CERCLA because of CERCLA's explicit exemption for petroleum.
See infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
273. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 1995).
274. Id.
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specific equitable remedies.' 5  The Furrer court ruled that RCRA's citizen
suit provision does not provide an express private cause of action for money
judgments. 6  Ultimately, the Furrer court held that RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B) simply does not support an implied private cause of action for
restitution" and concluded that only injunctive relief is available."
The Furrer court used the four factors set forth in Cort v. Ash 279 to
determine whether Congress intended to provide a monetary remedy under
RCRA's citizen suit provision.2  After examining the plain language of the
statute, the court concluded that under the first Con factor, the Furrers did not
qualify as members of the class for whose benefit the statute was created."'
275. Id. at 1094 (explaining that "prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief 'to enforce,' 'to
restrain,' and 'to order... other action... necessary'" are the type of equitable remedies available
under the statute) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B)(1988)).
276. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094. Interestingly, the Furrer court did not address the narrower
issue of whether restitution may be awarded under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) in the absence of an
"imminent and substantial endangerment." Id. at 1095 n.6. Instead, the court simply held that
restitution is an inappropriate remedy under the statute in all circumstances. Id. at 1095. But see
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1992) (stating that "the question of
what remedies are available under a statute that provides a private right of action is 'analytically
distinct' from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first place. Thus ... we presume the
availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.")
(emphasis added); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982) ('Congress, in the
endangerment provisions of RCRA . . . sought to invoke nothing less than the full equity powers
of the federal courts in the effort to protect public health [and] the environment."). RCRA §
6972(a)(1)(B) provides that "the district court shall have jurisdiction ... to restrain any person who
has contributed or who is contributing..., to order such person to take such other action as may
be necessary, or both .... " 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988) (emphasis added). Arguably, RCRA's grant
of equitable jurisdiction for citizen suits is sufficiently broad to encompass an award of restitution.
See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996) (implying that in some instances
restitution may be properly awarded under RCRA's citizen suit provision).
277. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101-02 ('[Wle cannotjustify inferring a remedy under § 6972 for the
recovery of cleanup costs when we are unable to find any indication that Congress intended to create
such a remedy.").
278. Id. at 1096 ("We do not think that 'such other action as may be necessary' contemplates
the payment of money to a party who already has cleaned up a contaminated site. Similarly,
jurisdiction 'to enforce' or 'to restrain' does not encompass the authority to award monetary
relief.").
279. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a listing of the Con factors, see supra note 225.
280. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (8th Cir. 1995). One commentator argues that
the Eighth Circuit's use of a Cort analysis in the Furrer decision allowed the court to "circumvent
the history of equity as applied by the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit themselves . . .
drastically curtail[ing] the historical power of the district courts." David A. Vandyke, Note, RCRA
Citizen Suits and Restitution: The Eighth Circuit's Full Con Press Strangles Equity's Traditional
Remedial Play, 61 Mo. L. REv. 489, 505 (1996).
281. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1095. The court specified:
Neither RCRA generally nor § 6972 specifically was enacted for the 'special benefit'
of those owners of property who pay to remediate soil contamination that has resulted
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In making this determination, the court compared RCRA's citizen suit provision
to another RCRA provision' and to relevant sections of CERCLA." 3 In
simple terms, the Eighth Circuit stated that Congress knows how to include a
cause of action for monetary awards in a statute if it so chooses.' Yet,
Congress specifically declined to include such a right in RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B). s5  According to the Furrer court, the language of RCRA's
citizen suit section explicitly defines the relief available to citizen plaintiffs under
the statute, and monetary restitution is conspicuously absent.1 6
Under the second Cort factor, the Eighth Circuit determined that RCRA
section 6972(a)(1)(B)'s legislative history does not support an implied cause of
action for restitution. 7 Next, the court noted that pursuant to the holding in
Sierra Club,' it had no duty to consider the last two Cort factors, since
examination of the first two yielded no evidence of Congress' intent to create a
private cause of action for restitution. 9  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, "out of an abundance of caution," examined the third and
fourth Cort factors ° and still failed to find any proof of congressional intent
from leaking underground gasoline storage tanks and for which they claim no
responsibility. In fact, a persuasive argument can be made that the Furrers are in a
class of persons that RCRA and § 6972 are directed against-the owners of a storage
facility where hazardous waste has presented an imminent and substantial endangerment.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
282. The provision examined by the court allows the EPA and the various states to recover
from "the owner or operator of an underground storage tank the costs incurred 'for undertaking
corrective action or enforcement action with respect to the release of petroleum from' such a tank."
Id. at 1096 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(6)(A) (1988)).
283. Id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1)(1988)).
284. Id. at 1096-97.
285. Id. at 1097.
286. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 1995) (adding that "it is an elemental
canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it") (citations omitted).
287. Id. at 1097. The court noted:
While there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to deny the
recovery of cleanup costs under § 6972, by the same token there is no evidence that
Congress intended to create such a remedy, and "implying a private right of action on
the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best."
Id. (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979)).
288. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981). For a discussion of Sierra Club,
see supra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
289. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1097.
290. Id. at 1097-1100. Under the third factor, the Furrer court commented that the overriding
purpose of RCRA is to "prevent the creation of hazardous waste sites, rather than to promote the
cleanup of existing sites." Id. at 1098. Furthermore, the court noted that several requirements in
the statute were designed to limit the use of citizen suits. Id. In particular, the notice provision of
RCRA § 6972(b)(1)(A), along with § 6972(b)(1)(B)'s constraint on the commencement of citizen
suits if the EPA administrator is already "diligently prosecuting" the suit, is intended to limit the
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to create a private cause of action for restitution.
291
After explicitly declining to follow the reasoning and analysis of the KFC
Western court,' the Furrer court noted that its holding left the plaintiffs
without a remedy.' The court stated that it was not unsympathetic to the
plaintiffs' case, but that due to its inability to discern evidence of supporting
congressional intent,' it could not justify implying a cause of action for
restitution under RCRA's citizen suit provision."9 The dissent argued that the
majority's holding was both unfair and poor public policy.' 9 However, as the
concurrence stated, under America's tripartite system of government, public
policy is not for the courts to determine, but for Congress to legislate.297
D. Deficiencies of the Furrer Holding
Like the KFC Western decision, the Furrer decision raises several
problematic issues which apply with equal force to the Supreme Court's recent
Meghrig decision. It discourages one of RCRA's basic tenets-prompt, efficient
cleanup of hazardous wastes.' Furthermore, as noted by the Furrer dissent,
the decision gives rise to unfairness and poor policy results, leaving private
use of citizen suits. Id. Indeed, the court stated that the "obvious goal" of these statutory
provisions is to "forestall citizen suits so that they become available only as a last resort." Id. See
also H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5612. ("[HSWA]
confers on citizens a LIMITED right under § 7002 to sue to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment. . . .") (emphasis added).
291. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1100 ("In none of the (Cort] factors do we find a basis for imputing
to Congress the intent to create in § 6972 an implied private cause of action for the recovery of
cleanup costs.").
292. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1101 (8th Cir. 1995). In declining to follow KFC
Western, the Furrer court distinguished the two prior Eighth Circuit opinions relied on by the KFC
Western court. Id. For a discussion of the cases relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in KFC Western,
see supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text. The Furrer court claimed that neither Aceto nor
NEPACCO addressed whether the recovery of the EPA's response costs was authorized by RCRA
§ 6973. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101. But see United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. 810
F.2d 726, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[Bjecause the government.. . sought to recover the response costs
it incurred . . . in the form of equitable relief as abatement costs under RCRA, on remand the
district court could grant the government recovery of such costs as a matter of equitable
discretion.").
293. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101.
294. According to the court, the "ultimate question is one of Congressional intent, not of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into
law." Id. at 1102 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
(1979)).
295. Id. at 1101-02.
296. Id. at 1102 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (Bennett, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
298. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988).
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plaintiffs without a means of recovery.'
Although consonant with Supreme Court statutory construction doctrine, the
Furrer majority's holding denies a RCRA remedy to innocent, injured land
owners.' In addition, because the plaintiff is not always able to pursue
alternate legal remedies,"' denying a RCRA remedy might result in the denial
of all relief. For example, depending on the substances causing the
contamination, the plaintiff may not be able to seek a remedy under CERCLA
due to CERCLA's petroleum exemption or because CERCLA covers a more
narrow scope of wastes than RCRA. °  Moreover, a suit under state tort
theory poses difficult legal hurdles which the plaintiff may be unable to
clear. 33
One commentator argues that careful environmental litigation planning can
prevent a land owner from being in the difficult legal position of seeking
response cost recovery under RCRA. 3' This argument erroneously assumes
that an average land owner knows enough about environmental law to recognize
which legal options are most effective in a given situation. 5 Unfortiftiately,
property owners cannot "plan" for something that they do not know exists. 3
299. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1102 (8th Cir. 1995) (Fagg, J., dissenting).
300. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
301. For a discussion of remedies alternative to RCRA, see infra part IV.
302. For a comparison between the scope of substances covered by CERCLA and the scope of
wastes covered by RCRA, see infra part IV.A.
303. For a discussion of state common law tort theories, see infra part IV.B.
304. Sullivan, supra note 28, at 10408.
305. Babich & Hanson, supra note 65, at 10165 ("Environmental statutes and regulations are
complex and many enforcement and cost recovery opportunities may be lost simply because the legal
remedies are not familiar to those who might use them."). The fact that plaintiffs are unaware of
the law is evidenced by the number of unsuccessful suits in which land owners have sought monetary
relief under RCRA. See, e.g., Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1101 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying
restitution of response costs to citizen plaintiffs); Portsmouth Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. BMI
Apartments Assocs., 847 F. Supp. 380, 385 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that RCRA's citizen suit
provision does not authorize an award of money damages for remedial costs, response costs, or the
costs of investigation); Kaufman & Broad-S. Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (denying a private party's request for restitution under RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B)); Gache
v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("RCRA does not authorize a
plaintiff in a citizen suit to recover remediation costs."); Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749
F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (permitting injunctive relief under the statute, but denying a
private action for damages); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990)
(refusing to award money damages to private plaintiffs for medical monitoring costs under §
6972(a)(l)(B)).
306. Evidence that plaintiffs do not effectively "plan" solutions for environmental contamination
is shown by the fact that suits are typically brought under RCRA's citizen suit once a plaintiff is in
a position of liability or loss, but not before. See, e.g., Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093 (explaining that
the Furrers brought suit to recover reimbursement of response costs); KFC Western, Inc. v.
Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1995) (commenting that KFC brought suit under RCRA §
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Some property owners, like the Furrers, are unaware of the contaminated
condition that the property is in when they purchase it.' Many years can
elapse between the time that an innocent party purchases a contaminated parcel
of property and the time that the purchaser becomes aware of the
contamination.' In fact, the land owner may not realize that the site is
contaminated until a local, state, or federal agency requires that the property be
remediated.09
However, once a cleanup order is levied on the land owner by an
environmental agency, it is typically too late for the owner to use RCRA's
citizen suit provision as it was arguably intended to be used: to obtain an
injunctive order against the responsible party.31 This is a result of the fact
that compliance deadlines accompany government ordered cleanups.31' By the
time a land owner is able to litigate a claim against the responsible party and
ensure the responsible party's remediation of the property, the government-
imposed deadline for cleanup has expired.312 Additionally, a land owner
cannot risk noncompliance by suing the responsible party first and remediating
the property later because penalties for a property owner's failure to observe a
cleanup deadline are severe.313 Therefore, property owners are left between
the proverbial rock and a hard place: they must expend money to remediate
property which they did not contaminate, and they have no legal method
whereby they can receive compensation from the responsible parties.3"4
6972(a)(1)(B) to recover cleanup costs), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
307. As a result, common law remedies may be precluded since the state statutes of limitations
may expire before the land owner realizes that there is problem with the property. See infra note
431 and accompanying text.
308. See KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 519 (explaining that 13 years had elapsed from the time that
KFC purchased the property from the Meghrigs to the time that KFC discovered that the property
was contaminated).
309. See Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093 (observing that the Furrers were not aware of the
contaminated state of their property until they were ordered to remediate the property by a state
environmental agency).
310. A mandatory injunction requiring the responsible party to remediate the property is the
only type of injunction that would give the land owner any measure of relief in this situation. A
preventative injunction that prohibits a defendant from creating a future endangerment would not be
helpful here because it would not force the defendant to act to alleviate the existing contamination.
For a discussion of the differences between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, see supra note
67.
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (1988).
312. See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1251 (1996).
313. For a discussion of the penalties that the EPA has the power to impose for non-compliance
with a RCRA cleanup order, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
314. See Sarah L. Inderbitzin, Taking the Burden off the Buyer: A Survey of Hazardous Waste
Disclosure Statutes, 1 ENVTL. L. 513, 558 (1995) (suggesting that if the transferor of contaminated
property fails to disclose the contamination to the transferee or the state, or submits false
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The statute's notice requirement confronts the property owner with an
additional time constraint and procedural dilemma.3"' The statute prohibits
commencement of an action by a private plaintiff until ninety days after he or
she has given notice of the endangerment to the EPA Administrator, the State,
and to any alleged contributor to the endangerment." 6 The notice provision
is intended to serve a twofold purpose.3t7 First, it allows the responsible party
to voluntarily remediate the condition of the property. 318  Second, it permits
the government to take action to enforce RCRA's regulations, while abrogating
the need for a land owner to do so.3M9 However, the notice provision delays
expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste sites, 320  contrary to RCRA's
purpose.32 '
E. The United States Supreme Court: Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.
In its unanimous reversal of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' KFC
Western decision, the United States Supreme Court sounded a death knell for the
possibility of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) being afforded a broad jurisdictional
base and scope of remedies. 3' The Court's decision in Meghrig sharply
circumscribes the forms of available relief under the statute, 323 limits the
jurisdiction of district courts, 3' and produces inequitable results and poor
information, "the buyer should have the option of voiding the transfer . . [which] should release
the transferee from any liability under CERCLA or RCRA, unless the transferee caused the
pollution").
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A) (1988).
316. Id.
317. See Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1995).
318. Id. (explaining that one purpose of the notice requirement is "to give the reputed violator
the opportunity to correct his behavior so that it conforms with RCRA").
319. Id. (stating that the statute's notice provision "allow[s] Government agencies to take
responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations, [and] thus obviat[es] the need for citizen
suits") (quoting Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989)).
320. This delay is especially problematic for a property owner who is faced with contamination
of a dire or "emergency" nature. If the property owner cleans the contamination during the 90 day
period, eliminating the emergency, restitution from the responsible party is barred. On the other
hand, if the property owner waits until after the 90 day period has expired, the contamination may
cause irreparable injury.
321. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988) ("The Congress hereby declares it to be the national
policy of the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be
reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible."). But see Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116
S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996) ("RCRA is not principally designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic
waste sites.").
322. See generally Meghng, 116 S. Ct. at 1256.
323. See Zaimes, supra note 113, at 1. See also infra notes 332-34.
324. See infra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
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public policy.3" However, in light of long-standing statutory construction
doctrine,3" the Court had but little choice to interpret RCRA's citizen suit
provision as it did.3' In order for the statute to serve a broader base of
environmental plaintiffs and purposes, it must be reformed by Congress.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit's KFC Western
case to address the conflict between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and to assess
the correctness of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RCRA's citizen suit
provision."' It began its analysis of the case by examining RCRA's purpose
and comparing it to CERCLA's purpose." It concluded that CERCLA is
designed to encourage the expeditious cleanup of toxic waste sites and to
compensate innocent parties who have remediated such sites." The Court
continued by stating that RCRA is not designed to achieve the same results as
CERCLA, but rather, is designed to reduce the generation of hazardous waste
and to secure the appropriate disposal, treatment, and storage of such waste."'
Next, the Court concluded that a RCRA citizen suit may not be brought to
recover past cleanup costs,"12 The Court stated that under a plain reading of
section 6972(a)(1)(B), the statute allows citizen plaintiffs to seek a mandatory
325. For a discussion of the inequities and poor public policy engendered by Meghrig, see
supra part I.D. While part I.D. identifies deficiencies in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Furrer,
these same problems apply to Meghrng.
326. For a brief summary of the Court's statutory construction doctrine, see supra notes 205-13
and accompanying text. For examples of how the Court's doctrine has applied to environmental
law, see supra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
327. But see Vandyke, supra note 280, at 505 (suggesting that the Court's decision in Meghrig
was inconsistent with prior doctrine, which grants broad equitable powers to district courts to fashion
equitable remedies). As one commentator noted:
By only implicitly limiting the [district] courts' equitable jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
now has two avenues available for answering any equitable jurisdiction issue. Under
the guise of limiting its equitable powers, the Court has created an easy escape from
tough equitable issues while retaining its previous, unlimited equitable powers. The
next time the Court is faced with a private plaintiff who is seeking a remedy under a
federal statue, the Court may invoke Porter v. Warner and find full equitable powers
or it may invoke Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. and proclaim the absence of authority
to grant relief.
Id. at 506. In Porter, the Supreme Court held, "Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the
inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise
of ... jurisdiction." Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). See supra note
276 for a brief discussion of the Court's 1992 revival of Porter in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
328. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
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or prohibitory injunction.33 3 According to the Court, however, neither remedy
is susceptible to being interpreted as permitting the award of past remediation
costs." In reaching this conclusion, the Court again compared CERCLA to
RCRA, specifically examining the statutes' remedial schemes.335 The Court
noted that CERCLA expressly permits private parties to recover the costs of past
remediation, while RCRA does not."
As additional support for its conclusion that RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
does not support an implied cause of action for the recovery of past cleanup
costs, the Court noted that the harm RCRA is intended to remedy is limited to
that which "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment. " " According to the Court, the words "may present" and
"imminent" plainly indicate that for harm to be covered by the statute, it must
threaten to occur immediately.3" Waste which no longer presents such a
danger is excluded from the statute's scope. 339 This clearly imposes a timing
restriction on when a suit may be brought, limiting the district court's
jurisdiction to addressing only "imminent" harm. 34
Finally, the Court raised three striking differences between CERCLA and
RCRA in support of its conclusion. First, unlike CERCLA, RCRA has no
statute of limitations period during which suit must be brought. 4  Second,
CERCLA requires evidence that response costs sought to be recovered are
333. Id. For an explanation of the differences between mandatory and prohibitory injunctive
relief, see supra note 67.
334. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996).
335. Id. at 1254-55.
336. td. at 1255 ("Congress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for
the recovery of cleanup costs, and that the language used to define the remedies under RCRA does
not provide that remedy.").
337. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988)).
338. Id. (citing the plain meaning of "imminent" in WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1245 (2d ed. 1934)). According to one commentator, "The
Supreme Court's very clear articulation of what the term 'imminent' means should also have a
bearing on other environmental statutes which contain the term 'imminent,' including CERCLA.
Those statutes must also now be read to mean 'threatens to occur immediately'." Zaimes, supra
note 113, at 2. Thus, the Meghrig decision may limit future environmental litigation through a
narrow reading of the jurisdictional timing requirement attached to the term 'imminent'. See id.
339. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (noting that the language of the statute "'implies that there
must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later.'"
(quoting Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (1994)).
340. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (1996).
341. Id. For a discussion of this omission in RCRA, see supra notes 243-47 and accompanying
text.
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reasonable, while RCRA has no similar provision. 2 Third, a citizen plaintiff
may not commence suit under RCRA's citizen suit provision without giving
ninety days notice to the EPA Administrator, the state in which the alleged
violation may occur, and potential defendants. 3 Moreover, a citizen suit may
not be brought if either the state or EPA is prosecuting an enforcement action
against the alleged violator.' CERCLA has no similar requirements.'
In light of these differences, the Court found that to permit RCRA to be used
as a vehicle for the recovery of past remediation costs would be irrational and
that the evidence clearly indicated a lack of congressional intent that the statute
be used as such.'
F. Deficiencies of the Meghrig Holding
Despite the fact that Meghrig is consonant with Supreme Court precedent,
it does not adequately resolve the problems posed by RCRA's citizen suit
provision. First, it fosters new uncertainties concerning the statute. Second, it
is subject to many of the same deficiencies raised by the KFC Western decision.
Although Meghrig defined section 6972(a)(1)(B)'s timing requirement, as
well as the scope of relief afforded for the recovery of past cleanup
expenses, 7 it did not determine whether RCRA's citizen suit provision
342. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1255. According to the Court, "If Congress had intended §
6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism, the absence of ... [a limitations period and a
reasonableness standard for costs] would be striking." Id. See supra notes 252-59 and
accompanying text for additional discussion regarding RCRA's failure to compel plaintiffs to show
the reasonableness of response costs sought to be recouped. See also infra notes 395-99 and
accompanying text.
343. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1255. This notice provision, as far as the Court is concerned,
demonstrates that RCRA was not intended to allow the restitution of past cleanup costs: "Those
parties with insubstantial problems, problems that neither the State nor the Federal Government feel
compelled to address, could recover their response costs, whereas those parties whose waste
problems were sufficiently severe as to attract the attention of Government officials would be left
without a recovery." Id. For further examination of RCRA's notice provision, see supra notes 315-
21 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A)(i)-iii) (1988).
344. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1255. See also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)-(C) (1988); supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
345. Meghrig, 116 S.Ct. at 1255. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988).
346. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (1996). In determining that
Congress did not intend to imply a private cause of action for the recovery of past cleanup costs
under RCRA, the Court did not consider RCRA's legislative history. Yeager, supra note 210, at
668 n.33. In fact, although the Meghrig case provided the Court an opportunity to clarify its
statutory construction jurisprudence on implied private causes of action, the Court did not do so.
See id. at 639. Consequently, the analysis used by lower courts to determine congressional intent
to imply a private cause of action in federal statutes remains inconsistent. Id.
347. See Yeager, supra note 210, at 639.
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permits a cause of action for recovery of future costs. 4  To illustrate this
situation, the following hypothetical may be helpful. 9 First, suppose a
citizen plaintiff brings a RCRA action seeking injunctive relief in the form of an
order requiring the defendant to remediate the property during the existence of
an imminent and substantial endangerment. " Second, the district court issues
the cleanup order.35' Third, the defendant refuses to obey the court's order,
and the plaintiff, after providing timely notice of intent, undertakes to remediate
the property to stop the waste.352 The issue this hypothetical raises is whether
the district court, pursuant to jurisdiction which is properly invoked at the
commencement of the suit, has the authority to permit the plaintiff to remediate
the site and then award restitution to the plaintiff.353
The Court never answered the question posed by this hypothetical?'
One commentator argues that as a practical matter the issue of the statute's
scope in this situation is unlikely to arise as a consequence of the district court's
contempt powers.3 55 Specifically, the district court will never have to flex the
viability of the statute's muscle to fashion a remedy in the face of a
"contumacious defendant. " 5  Instead, the district court will afford the
plaintiff a remedy via its contempt powers.3 57 However, even the respondent's
counsel in Meghrig conceded that RCRA's citizen suit provision could
conceivably be used to gain restitution for future damages from an uncooperative
defendant. 35s
Leaving the statute's scope undefined in this manner may promote
conflicting judicial responses and may raise questions for litigants who are in
this situation. If, as Meghrig suggests, restitution may be properly awarded in
some scenarios, the Court failed to resolve the problems posed by the statute's
348. Zaimes, supra note 113, at 2.
349. Id. This hypothetical, posed by Justice Kennedy during oral argument, was further
developed by Justices Breyer and Souter. Official Transcript at 13-22, KFC Western, Inc. v.
Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
350. Zaimes, supra note 113, at 2.
351. Id.
352. Official Transcript at 16, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
353. Id. at 19.
354. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996) ("Without considering
whether a private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay cleanup
costs which arise after a RCRA citizen suit has been properly commenced, .... we [decide] that a
private party cannot recover the cost of a past cleanup effort under RCRA . . . ") (emphasis added).
355. Zaimes, supra note 113, at 2.
356. Id. at 2-3.
357. Id.
358. Official Transcript at 19-20, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
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lack of a burden of proof scheme for the validity of response costs and lack of
guidance for the appropriateness of response costs sought to be recovered.35 9
This will likely create uncertainties for litigants. 3' On the other hand, since
under Meghrig restitution may not be granted for past cleanup costs, the Court's
decision accents the difficulties associated with the statute's notice
requirement. 1  It also results in unfairness to the class of property owners
who remediate their property first and seek reimbursement of cleanup costs
later. 2 This evidences poor public policy.'
Judicial attempts to address section 6972(a)(1)(B)'s dilemmas are
inadequate, as evidenced by the lack of resolution for private litigants after the
KFC Western and Furrer decisions, as well as the Supreme Court's decision in
Meghrig. The KFC Western decision provides a remedy for private plaintiffs
that is contrary to statutory construction doctrine and raises a number of
procedural ambiguities, such as the lack of a limitations period. 3" Because
the Court intimated that in some cases restitution may be awarded to plaintiffs,
many of these ambiguities will apply in the wake of the Meghrig decision as
well.' Furthermore, the Furrer and Meghrig decisions deny restitution of
past cleanup costs to private plaintiffs and emphasize the problems posed by the
statute's notice requirement. 3' These numerous problems suggest that
Congress did not desire injured landowners to use RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B)
to obtain restitution.3 7 However, the problems also indicate that Congress did
not anticipate the unfairness resulting from the limited scope of section
6972(a)(1)(B). Therefore, one viable solution which would be both fair and
consistent with RCRA's purpose is legislative action expanding the scope of
RCRA's citizen suit provision.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE APPEAL: THE NEED FOR AN EXPANSIVE AMENDMENT TO
RCRA's CITIZEN SurF PROVISION
Although RCRA purportedly exists to regulate and enforce a cradle-to-grave
management scheme for hazardous waste, " it has failed to achieve its
359. See supra notes 252-63 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 256.
361. See supra part IM.D.
362. See supra notes 300-14 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
364. See supra part rn.B.
365. See supra part III.B.
366. See supra part I.D.
367. See Brief for Petitioner at *24-25, 1995 WL 668003, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 116
S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (No. 95-83).
368. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6981 (1988).
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goals.' RCRA's poor track record is partially attributable to the structure
of the statute itself." It is a statute plagued with ambiguous legislation and
unclear liability apportionment. 371' However, another reason for RCRA's
inadequacy is that when hazardous waste cleanup fails because of a lack of
financial solvency among responsible parties, the costs of a RCRA cleanup are
absorbed by the EPA.3 2  Expanding the scope of RCRA's citizen suit
provision would alleviate the EPA's burden and encourage the expeditious
abatement of hazardous waste contamination. 3
Only two of the federal environmental statutes are designed to respond to
hazardous waste and substance contamination: RCRA and CERCLA.374
CERCLA, however, does not always provide adequate remedies for private
plaintiffs who incur costs remediating contaminated property. 375 As a result,
369. A 1988 report by the GAO evidencesthat of 836 RCRA cases reviewed by the GAO, EPA
and state enforcement responses were only timely and suitable in 37% of the cases. EPA
STANDARDS, supra note 142, at 2. An earlier report asserts, "Federal agency performance in
implementing RCRA has not been exemplary." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-
86-76), HAZARDOUS WASTE: FEDERAL CIVIL AGENCIES SLow To COMPLY WITH REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS 3 (May 1986). The report also indicates that over 70% of the known handlers of
hazardous waste operators functioning under RCRA that were reviewed by the GAO had not been
inspected by government environmental agencies. Id. Worse yet, almost half of the remaining 30 %
that had been inspected had violations. Id. A 1985 GAO report reflects a consensus among EPA
and state officials in New Jersey, Illinois, California, and Massachusetts that illegal disposal of waste
is a continuing problem and that government measures designed to thwart such disposal have not
been adequate. ILLEGAL DISPOSAL, supra note 130, at 13.
370. ROBERT V. ZENER, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 196 (1981) ("Because
RCRA does not provide either funds or a management framework for the cleanup of environmentally
contaminated sites, the EPA is required to proceed against private parties.").
371. Van der Reis, supra note 28, at 1287.
372. Where responsible parties have failed to remediate a contaminated RCRA site due to
financial insolvency, the EPA must clean the site and may only rarely and under certain conditions
shift its response costs to the Superfund. ILLEGAL DISPOSAL, supra note 130, at 12. The following
situations are considered in determining when the EPA may transfer the costs of a RCRA cleanup
to the Superfund: (1) the hazardous waste facility is no longer authorized to operate under RCRA
(usually due to prior compliance failures); or (2) the parties responsible for the contamination are
deemed unwilling, on a case by case basis, to clean up the facility under RCRIA; or (3) the owner
or operator of the facility is bankrupt. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-88-48),
HAZARDOUS WASTE: CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANUPS WILL TAKE YEARS To COMPLETE 4 (Dec.
1987).
373. See EPA STANDARDS, supra note 142, at 2. The simple fact is that without the private
sector's financial assistance-in the form of legal initiatives brought under the citizen suit provisions
of the federal environmental statutes-environmental contamination remains largely unabated. Id.
374. BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 61, at 179.
375. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10494. See also R. Lisle Baker & Michael J. Markoff, By-
Products Liability: Using Common Law Private Actions to Clean Up, 10 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
99, 106-08 (1986) (discussing limitations to private cost recovery actions under CERCLA).
Recently, circuit court rulings have made response cost recovery under CERCLA more difficult to
obtain. "The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that only
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private plaintiffs have turned to RCRA as a means of obtaining restitution.376
For a better understanding of CERCLA's shortfalls, a comparison of the two
statutes may be useful.
A. A Comparison of CERCLA and RCRA: Why RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B)
is Preferred Over CERCLA as a Vehicle for Suit
CERCLA provides the EPA with the authority to remedy inactive,
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites which pose a threat to human health
or the environment. 3" Typically, CERCLA applies where the responsible
parties are absent, insolvent, or recalcitrant." RCRA, on the other hand,
provides the EPA with a comprehensive hazardous waste management program
which governs the daily generation and handling of hazardous waste at sites that
are in current operation." There are several differences between the statutes
that are relevant to their functions as means of recovery for private
plaintiffs.'
Initially, the statutes apply to different contaminants. RCRA contamination
includes both "hazardous wastes" and "solid wastes," 3"' while CERCLA's
private parties who are 'innocent'- that is, who are not liable under CERCLA-may bring cost
recovery action under CERCLA." Robertson, supra note 30, at 10494 (citing United Techs. Corp.
v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,
30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995)).
376. See Fung, supra note 38, at 787.
377. James B. Brown & Glen C. Hansen, Nuisance Law and Petroleum Underground Storage
Tank Contamination: Plugging a Hole in the Statutes, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 643, 648 (1994). See also
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991).
378. BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 61, at 180. CERCLA was essentially enacted in response
to the Love Canal disaster of the late 1970s. Id. In the Love Canal case, roughly 21,800 tons of
industrial wastes were dumped between 1942 and 1953 on to land that eventually was sold to the
Niagara Falls Board of Education. Homes and schools were built on the land. Id. In 1978,
chemicals began leaking into residential basements, causing the New York Commissioner of Health
to declare a health emergency in the area of the site. Id. Prior to CERCLA's enactment, none of
the existing laws permitted the EPA to "respond to and clean up such environmental contamination."
Id. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
379. See BATTLE & LiPEimS, supra note 61, at 1, 2. RCRA provides "cradle to grave"
regulation of hazardous and solid waste, managing the waste throughout its lifecycle. United States
v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-
1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120). See generally PETER S.
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & PoLicY 560-70 (1994) (providing an
overview of RCRA's regulatory system).
380. See generally Miller, supra note 96, at 929 (comparing CERCLA's and RCRA's citizen
suit provisions, as well as providing a general overview of each statute's purpose); Fung, supra note
38 (contrasting RCRA and CERCLA as vehicles for private party recovery); BATTLE & LIPELES,
supra note 61 (providing a comprehensive explanation of each statute).
381. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), (27) (1988).
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scope of coverage is limited to "hazardous substances."3" 2 Therefore, RCRA
applies to a wider range of contamination.3"3 Because it applies to more
contaminants, RCRA facilitates greater environmental cleanup and creates a
broader cause of action for citizen plaintiffs than CERCLA.8 4
Perhaps the most significant contaminant accorded different treatment under
RCRA and CERCLA is petroleum.' CERCLA expressly excludes petroleum
from its definition of a "hazardous substance."386 As a result, plaintiffs who
own property contaminated with petroleum waste have no remedy under
CERCLA.W By contrast, RCRA does not exclude petroleum from its
definitions of "hazardous waste" or "solid waste." 3s Therefore, a large part
of RCRA's appeal to private plaintiffs, flows from the fact that a remedy for
petroleum contamination may be obtained under RCRA.3 89
382. Id. § 9601(14). CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substances" incorporates anything
designated as "hazardous waste" under RCRA, but it does not include materials labeled as "solid
waste" under RCRA. Id.
383. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10495. Interestingly, a hazardous waste site which is
regulated by RCRA must comply with the other federal environmental statutes which apply to the
site that are administered by the EPA. Oppliger, supra note 26, at 65 n.30. To illustrate, a
hazardous waste facility that is regulated by RCRA must satisfy the directives of the Clean Water
Act if it discharges wastes into navigable waters. Similarly, if it emits harmful pollutants into the
air, it must abide by the performance standards specified in the Clean Air Act. Ifs RCRA facility
handles hazardous wastes that contain more than 50 parts per million of PCB's, it is subject to
regulation by the Toxic Substances Control Act. RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL 111 128-29 (1986).
For a sampling of other federal environmental statutes that are enforced by the EPA, see supra note
26.
384. See Robertson, supra note 30, at 10495. See also Citizens Can Recover Pollution Cleanup
Costs, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at B2.
385. Fung, supra note 38, at 821.
386. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). Section 101(14) in relevant part provides: "The term
'hazardous substance'. .. does not include petroleum, including crude oil .. .natural gas, natural
gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and
such synthetic gas)." Id. To date, congressional efforts to expand CERCLA's definition of
hazardous substances to include petroleum have failed. See Yeager, supra note 210, at 649.
387. Fung, supra note 38, at 787. The contaminants at issue in KFC Western were petroleum
waste products. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 1251 (1996). Similarly, petroleum contamination gave rise to the litigation in Furrer. Furrer
v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 1995). The plaintiffs in these cases, unable to obtain a
remedy under CERCLA, turned to RCRA for relief.
388. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6979 (1988).
389. See Fung, supra note 38, at 787 (noting that RCRA provides relief for an entire class of
plaintiffs that have been left "stranded" by CERCLA's petroleum exclusion).
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In addition, under CERCLA, costs are recoverable by private plaintiffs only
after their response actions are completed. 3 ° By comparison, RCRA permits
private plaintiffs to seek mandatory injunctions, compelling defendants to
remedy contamination.39 ' Thus, RCRA allows private plaintiffs to obtain
relief when they are insolvent or otherwise incapable of conducting a cleanup
first and seeking restitution later.
Furthermore, under RCRA section 6972(e), courts are expressly authorized
to award litigation costs to prevailing parties.3" The term "litigation costs"
includes expert witness fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, and other expenses
associated with litigation under section 6972(a)(1)(B). 393  In comparison,
CERCLA does not specifically permit the recovery of attorneys' fees. 3"
Under CERCLA, costs sought to be recovered by a private plaintiff from
a private defendant"'5 must be consistent with the NCP.3" Currently,
RCRA's recovery scheme has no such requirement.397  RCRA's lack of
guidance for the appropriateness of response costs poses difficulties for
litigants,3  but can be addressed in an amendment to RCRA's current
scheme. 39
390. Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 801 F. Supp. 1432, 1435 (M.D. Pa.
1992). Courts may grant declaratory relief for future costs under CERCLA. Fallowfield Dev.
Corp. v. Strunk, Nos. CIV. A. 89-8644, CIV. A. 90-4431, 1993 WL 157723, *10 (E.D. Pa. May
11, 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13 (g)).
391. Babich, supra note 27, at 10123. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988); supra
note 67.
392. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988). See also Robertson, supra note 30, at 10495.
393. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988).
394. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994). According to the Supreme
Court, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable litigation expense unless courts can discern an explicit
authorization by Congress to award such fees. Id. at 1965. To examine case law that provides a
general statement of the Supreme Court's doctrine on the award of attorneys' fees, see Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
395. The CERCLA scheme permits private plaintiffs to recover restitution from private
defendants and the government's Superfund. Baker & Markoff, supra note 375, at 106. See also
Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding private causes of action
under CERCLA). Because RCRA has no counterpart to the Superfund, this note is concerned
exclusively with restitution recovery between private litigants under CERCLA and RCRA and will
not delve into private recovery from the Superfund.
396. See supra text accompanying note 254. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988).
397. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10945.
398. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
399. See infra part V.B.
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Finally, RCRA authorizes courts to impose severe penalties' on
defendants who fail to comply with cleanup orders."0 Because CERCLA suits
between private litigants exist only as cost recovery actions,' they do not
include severe penalties for non-compliance with cleanup orders. 4 3 Arguably,
RCRA's scheme of penalties, coupled with the potential recovery of litigation
costs, is a more threatening scheme to defendants than CERCLA.'
Despite the noted differences in the statutes, RCRA and CERCLA share
some similarities. 5  For example, each statute has been interpreted as
imposing joint and several liability on parties responsible for contamination. In
New York v. Shore Realty Corp. ,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the imposition of joint and several liability on responsible parties for
restitution 7 of a plaintiffs response costs was appropriate under CERCLA
if the harm was indivisible." Similarly, RCRA is interpreted as imposing
joint and several liability on responsible parties for restitution of all response
costs.
Another similarity between CERCLA and RCRA concerns defendants'
rights of contribution.41 CERCLA expressly permits private plaintiffs to
400. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
401. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1988).
402. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
403. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(0(1) (1988).
404. Fung, supra note 38, at 821.
405. See id. at 805 (explaining that the "interlocking provisions of RCRA and CERCLA form
a comprehensive residuals regulation and enforcement scheme").
406. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
407. "Courts have characterized CERCLA cost recovery claims as equitable claims for
restitution, rather than claims for damages in tort." Robertson, supra note 30, at 10494 n.49 (citing
United States. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982)); United States
v. Wade, 653 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
408. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1037. Other courts, using the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433A, have determined that joint and several liability may be assessed under CERCLA if the harm
is indivisible. Accord United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). But see United States v. A
& F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. 111. 1984) (holding that "a rigid application of
the Restatement approach to joint and several liability is inappropriate" due to the unfairness such
extensive liability might impose on a defendant who contributed only a small amount to the
contamination at a site).
409. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10495 (citing Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 23 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 20665, 20672 (E.D. Cal. 1993)).
410. "Contribution" under CERCLA § 9613(0(1) allows a defendant who is held jointly and
severally liable for contamination to seek partial reimbursement from other responsible parties.
United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Anspec Co. v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1251 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a defendant's right of
contribution under CERCLA); Thomas C. Russo, Contribution under CERCLA, 14 COLo. J. ENVrL.
L. 267 (1989) (providing a general overview of contribution under CERCLA). Under RCRA, the
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recover contribution from responsible parties.41' In United States v.
Valentine,412 a district court implied a right of contribution under RCRA
section 6973.413 This led one commentator to believe that, in time, courts
would recognize a right of contribution under section 6972(a)(1)(B).1 4
In fact, allowing both restitution and contribution under RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B) would not contravene CERCLA.415 Instead, it would address
unsatisfactory aspects of the current RCRA-CERCLA scheme. 4" The
legislative development of the statutes are interwoven, 417 as are the
enforcement provisions. 4t" Allowing litigants who sue under RCRA's citizen
suit provision to obtain the same remedies that CERCLA provides would
complement the statutes' existing schemes of permitting private parties to
undertake environmental cleanups for the public benefit.
term "contribution" is defined the same way as it is under CERCLA. See United States v.
Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, 632 (D. Wyo. 1994) (allowing defendants a right of contribution under
RCRA § 6973).
411. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). In relevant part, this section provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action .... In
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Id.
412. 856 F. Supp. at 627.
413. Id. (stating,that RCRA § 6973 "gives broad authority [to courts] to grant all relief
necessary to ensure complete protection of the public health and environment." (quoting United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo. 1985))).
414. Robertson, supra note 30, at 10495. While the right of contribution is not express in
RCRA § 6972(a)(l)(B), a statutory amendment permitting such a right of action would be consistent
with CERCLA and would promote greater environmental cleanup. See infra section V.B.
415. See TanglewoodE. Homeownersv. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1574 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that because relevant statutory definitions in RCRA are the same as the definitions
in CERCLA, the same remedies should be available under RCRA and CERCLA causes of action).
416. Fung, supra note 38, at 841.
417. Id. at 820. As one commentator explains:
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 . . . . In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA upon
realizing that RCRA was "clearly inadequate" to deal with the problem of inactive
hazardous waste sites. Four years later, Congress found that its hazardous waste
program was not progressing; there was increasing public concern about hazardous
waste and conflicts regarding CERCLA. To address these concerns, Congress enacted
the 1984 RCRA Amendments.
Id. at 805-06.
418. Id. at 820.
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B. The Deficiencies of Common Law Tort Theories of Recovery
Just as CERCLA suits lack satisfactory compensation methods for private
plaintiffs who seek restitution of response costs, common law tort bases of
litigation are inadequate compensation mechanisms. There are several causes
of action that can be raised by private plaintiffs under the common law of tort
for the transfer of contaminated property.4 9 Examination of one potential tort
action-abnormally dangerous activity-will identify some of the inadequacies
of common law actions. The same or similar deficiencies are evident in other
tort actions,4 ' such as misrepresentation,42  negligence," vendor
liability4' and nuisance.' u
419. Baker & Markoff, supra note 375, at 108.
420. Id. at 110.
421. Historically, the traditional rule of caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware") governed
misrepresentation actions. See Swinton v. Whitinville Say. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808, 809 (Mass.
1942). This rule prohibited buyers from recovering from sellers who intentionally failed to disclose
known defects, such as property contamination. See Henshaw v. Cabeceiras, 437 N.E.2d 1072,
1074 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (reaffirming Swinton, while ruling that a seller is not liable to a buyer
for nondisclosure of a known defect when the seller is under no duty to disclose). The current rule
is found under § 551 of the Restatement of Torts. It imposes liability on a seller who intentionally
fails to disclose a defect which, if known, would cause the buyer to refrain from buying.
R-STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1976).
422. In successful negligence suits, plaintiffs were traditionally required to show actual
causation: (1) duty of care, (2) breach of the duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See CLARENCE
MORRIS ET AL., MORRIS ON TORTS § 1, at 44 (2d ed. 1980). As a result, cases frequently failed
because "actual causation was impossible to demonstrate due to circumstances beyond the plaintiff's
control." Van der Reis, supra note 28, at 1272. For example, the defendant may have harmed the
plaintiff in a way that made it infeasible for the plaintiff to prove the identity of the responsible
defendant. Id. at n.27.
After time, the courts created an alternative liability theory for nuisance actions. See Summers
v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948). This new approach was codified in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B) (1977). However, a plaintiff still "faces 'the
difficulty and expense of proving legal causation between a[n] ... act or omission and the harmful
consequence alleged.'" Van der Reis, supra note 28, at 1292 (quoting Joseph K. Brenner, Liability
for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEO.
L.J. 1047, 1059 (1981)).
423. To establish a cause of action for the land seller's liability, the buyer must show four
things: that the seller knew or had reason to know of the contamination; that the seller realized or
should have realized the risk; that the seller had reason to believe that the buyer would not detect
the contamination or realize the risk; and that the buyer did not know or have reason to know of the
contamination or risk. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §353(1) (1964). A property owner's
recovery under a vendor liability cause of action can be frustrated in several ways. First, the buyer
is limited to recovery for injury incurred prior to the discovery of the contamination. ABC Builders,
Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 930-33 (Wyo. 1981). Second, before recovery can be obtained, a
court must first decide that the contamination poses an unreasonable risk to human health. See
Century Display Mfg. Corp. v. D.R. Wager Constr. Co., 376 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ill. 1978) (holding
that the mere presence of flammable liquids in sealed pipes and tanks did not create an unreasonable
risk). Finally, since the theory of recovery is tort-based, courts may deny compensation for purely
economic losses. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 326 (I11. 982) (holding that solely
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One theory of liability under the common law is the "abnormally dangerous
activity" cause of action.'u A party who contaminates property by conducting
an abnormally dangerous activity on it is liable to the property owner for
cleanup costs.4 26 Hazardous waste disposal constitutes an abnormally
dangerous activity, and defendants are strictly liable for such activity to
government plaintiffs.4' Therefore, private plaintiffs should be able to
recover from responsible parties using this strict liability rule. 4' However,
strict liability in tort fails to provide current owners with an adequate
remedy.
429
One practical bar to recovery is that plaintiffs may not know who to sue in
cases where the disposal occurred years prior.' 3 Furthermore, state statutes
of limitations prohibit recovery for tortious acts that are remote in time. 431 An
additional problem is that tortious acts are typically remedied through
compensatory damage awards; however, the measure of damages is the owner's
diminution in value of the estate, rather than the cost of cleanup.432
economic losses cannot be recovered in tort).
424. The general rule for nuisance actions is that a seller who did not generate the nuisance
remains liable for the buyer's cleanup costs, but only until the buyer detects the nuisance and has
a reasonable opportunity to abate it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840A(2) (1977).
425. See State v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
426. See RFSTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Under the Restatement analysis,
determination of an abnormally dangerous activity is reached by considering the following factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(t) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Id.
427. See State v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983).
428. Baker & Markoff, supra note 375, at 110.
429. Id.
430. Id. See also Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10141, 10144 (1995) ("In general, the common-law system is geared to
providing relief to plaintiffs who can prove that a specific defendant is responsible for a specific
injury. Such proof is often difficult in disputes about environmental pollution, however.").
Contaminants may have many potential sources, and selecting the appropriate defendant can pose
proof problems. Id. at 10144-45.
431. See IDAHO CODE § 5-219 (1979) (requiring recovery actions for. property injury to be
brought within two years of the time that the plaintiff discovered or should have reasonably
discovered the contamination). The environmental law statutes typically allow more lenient
limitations periods. For example, CERCLA § 9612(d) permits plaintiffs to bring suit to recover
response costs for up to six years after the completion of any response activities. 42 U.S.C. §
9612(d) (1988).
432. Baker & Markoff, supra note 375, at 75.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/7
1996] EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF RCRA 247
Consequently, a common law remedy could compensate the owner for the
tortious acts, but may not ensure the property's remediation if the cleanup costs
exceed the loss in value. 433
A final problem with common law tort actions is their costliness."
Attorneys charge the same fees whether their clients win or lose, and even
simple tort cases typically cost tens of thousands of dollars to pursue.
435
Furthermore, although a monetary damage award may compensate a private
party for property contamination, it may fail to cover the costs of litigation.4 36
RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) provides more complete relief for property
owners than the common law or CERCLA. However, RCRA's existing citizen
suit provision is too limited in scope to award private plaintiffs the best potential
remedies under the statute. Therefore, an efficient, expansive, and effective
amendment to RCRA's citizen suit provision is necessary.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RCRA's CITIZEN Surr PROVISION
This Note proposes that Congress amend RCRA's citizen suit provision4
to expressly provide courts jurisdiction to award restitution to a private plaintiff
regardless of the timing of the plaintiffs suit.4' This proposal addresses the
problems of vagueness in the statute that cannot be adequately resolved by the
judiciary.439 First, it articulates when a plaintiff must sue to recover relief and
specifically permits a suit to be brought in the absence of an imminent and
substantial endangerment, provided that the contamination previously posed animminent and substantial endangerment. Second, the proposal specifies what
types of relief the statute affords private parties: injunctive relief, restitution and
contribution. Third, it sets out limitations periods for restitution and
contribution actions to ensure that defendants are insulated against suits that are
brought many years after the last waste disposal occurred.' Fourth, this
proposal provides guidelines for the appropriateness of costs sought to be
433. Id. The federal environmental law statutes typically allow plaintiffs to recover all cleanup
costs and any other necessary response costs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
434. See Babich, supra note 430, at 10145 ("[A] citizen must either be relatively wealthy or
gravely injured to vindicate his or her rights in the common-law tort system.").
435. Id.
436. Id. RCRA, unlike the common law, empowers the courts to award litigation expenses to
prevailing parties. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988).
437. See supra notes 99-100. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988).
438. The revision will allow plaintiffs to sue after the imminent and substantial endangerment
posed by the contaminated property ceases to exist.
439. See supra parts IL.B, D, F.
440. See supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning the absence
of a limitations period in the statute.
Panos: Expanding the Scope of RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B)—A Citizen Suit
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
248 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
recovered to safeguard defendants against exorbitant cost recoveries and requires
plaintiffs to prove the appropriateness of such costs."' Fifth, it reduces the
current ninety day notice requirement in the statue to thirty days to encourage
the availability of injunctive relief in RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) and to expedite
cleanup. 4
42
A. Purpose and Need
Allowing an express cause of action for restitution effectuates RCRA's
purpose of expedient cleanup" 3 and creates a more just outcome for
landowners who remediate property that they did not contaminate.' 4  It also
facilitates needed private cleanup of the environment in a period when
government action is financially constrained." Furthermore, suits brought
under RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B) provide private plaintiffs with several distinct
advantages over CERCLA suits' 6 and common law actions in tort. 7
B. Section-by-Section Analysis
TITLE I: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND
RECOVERY AcT's CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION.
Section 1- Definitions."
(1) Administrator: The term "Administrator" means the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency. 449
(2) Disposal: The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste
or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters,
including ground water.'
441. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
444. For a discussion of the injustice that is created by denying restitution, see supra part M.D.
445. See supra part l.B.
446. See supra notes 377-418 and accompanying text.
447. See supra section IV.B.
448. These definitions are the same as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1988). They are
reproduced here to help the reader understand the proposed amendment. They appear out of order
as compared to their original form.
449. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(1) (1988).
450. § 6903(3).
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(3) Hazardous Waste: The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste,
or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible,
illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.'
(4) Hazardous Waste Generation: The term "hazardous waste generation"
means the act or process of producing hazardous waste.452
(5) Hazardous Waste Management: The term "hazardous waste
management" means the systematic control of the collection, source
separation, storage, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery,
and disposal of hazardous wastes.453
(6) Person: The term "person" means an individual, trust, firm, joint
stock company, corporation (including a government corporation),
partnership, association ....
(7) Solid Waste: The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse,
sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or
air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities .... 455
(8) Solid Waste Management: The term "solid waste management" means
the systematic administration of activities which provide for the
collection, source separation, storage, transportation, transfer,
processing, treatment, and disposal of solid waste.456
451. § 6903(5)(A)-(B).
452. § 6903(6).
453. § 6903(7).
454. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988).
455. § 6903(27).
456. § 6903(28).
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(9) Solid Waste Management Facility: The term "solid waste management
facility" includes-
(C) any facility for the collection, source separation, storage,
transportation, transfer, processing, treatment or disposal of solid
wastes, including hazardous wastes, whether such facility is
associated with facilities generating such wastes or otherwise.
45 7
(10) State: The term "State" means any of the several States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands.'
(11) Storage: The term "storage," when used in connection with hazardous
waste, means the containment of a period of years, in such a manner
as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste.4 9
(12) Treatment: The term "treatment," when used in connection with
hazardous waste, means any method, technique, or process, including
neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological
character or composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize
such waste or so as to render such waste nonhazardous, safer for
transport . . . amendable for storage, or reduced in volume. Such
term includes activity or processing designed to change the physical
form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as to render it
nonhazardous. 4')
Commentary to Section 1: The terms and definitions included in
Section 1 are used by RCRA and RCRA's citizen suit provision as
amended in 1984. The definitions are reproduced here in altered order
to provide a better understanding of RCRA as it currently exists. The
same terms and definitions will be used by the proposed amendment.
457. § 6903(29)(C).
458. § 6903(31).
459. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33) (1988).
460. § 6903(34).
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Section 2- Guidelines for Establishing Powers of and Remedies for Private
Plaintiffs.
Section 2 amends § 6972(a)(1)(B) of RCRA to read:4 1
In general.., any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(A) against any person, including the United States, and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present
generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator
of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which either
presents, or at a prior time presented, an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment...
Commentary to Section 2(A): Part (A) of Section 2 sets forth changes
to the timing limitations of RCRA's current citizen suit provision. As
amended, the citizen suit provision allows a plaintiff to bring an action
against the responsible party as long as the contamination currently
presents, or at one time presented, an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment.
Section 2 amends RCRA § 6972(a)(2) to read:
(B) ... Any action brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may
be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred or in the District Court of the District of Columbia. The district
court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the parties . . . to restrain any person who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take such other
action as may be necessary . . . or to order equitable restitution of the
response costs plaintiffs incur remediating the property.
Commentary to Section 2(B): Part (B) of Section 2 amends the scope
of relief provided under RCRA's citizen suit provision. It specifically
authorizes courts to grant restitution to private plaintiffs who respond
461. The italic typeface denotes the original statutory language of RCRA § 6972 throughout this
amendment.
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to contamination. By expressly allowing restitution under the statute,
plaintiffs will be permitted to clean up dangerous contaminants present
on their property and seek reimbursement later from the responsible
parties. The allowance of restitution as a remedy will engender
property owners' increased willingness to eliminate endangerments on
their property and will serve RCRA's basic purpose of expeditious
cleanup. Private restitution suits should not be barred by government
action. 462
Section 2:
(C) Contribution'
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable
or potentially liable under section 6972(a)(1)(B) of this title. Such
claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate.
Commentary to Section 2(C): Part (C) of Section 2 permits
responsible parties to seek contribution from other responsible parties.
Its inclusion will alleviate hardships on defendants who are only
partially responsible for contamination of a site. Permitting
contribution actions will produce a more equitable result than a scheme
in which a defendant is wholly liable for contamination produced
partially by others. Private contribution suits should not be barred by
government action.'
Section 3- Statute of Limitations. 46
Section 3:
(A) Claims for recovery of costs:
462. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)
(1988).
463. This section is borrowed in part from CERCLA § 9612(0(1). See 42 U.S.C. § 9612(0(1)
(1988).
464. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)
(1988).
465. This section is modeled after CERCLA's limitations periods for private recovery actions
and contribution actions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9612(d), 9613(g)(3) (1988).
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No claim may be presented under this section for restitution of the
costs referred to in section 6972(a)(1)(B) of this title more than six years
after the time of completion of all response action.
Commentary to Section 3(A): Part (A) of Section 3 provides a
limitations period in order to restrict plaintiffs' restitution suits. The
limitations period is a necessary addition to the statute to protect
defendants who are sued for waste disposal that occurred many years
earlier. Essentially, it provides a framework from which parties to
potential RCRA cost recovery actions can obtain guidance.
Section 3:
(B) Claims for contribution:
No action for contribution for response costs or other losses may be
commenced more than three years after the date of completion of any
response action under this title.
Commentary to Section 3(B): Part (B) of Section 3 provides a
limitations period in order to restrict defendants' contribution suits.
The limitations period is a necessary addition to the statute to protect
other potentially liable parties who are sued for disposal acts that
occurred many years prior. Part (B) contributes a framework from
which parties to potential RCRA contribution actions can obtain
guidance.
Section 4- Guidance for the Appropriateness of Costs Sought to be
Recovered. 6
Section 4:
(A) The President 7 shall publish a national contingency scheme (NCS)
for the removal of hazardous waste and solid waste. Such a scheme shall
include a section which establishes procedures and standards for responding to
releases of hazardous wastes and solid wastes, which shall include at a
minimum:
466. This section is borrowed largely from CERCLA §§ 9605, 9607(a)(4)(B). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9605, 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
467. The EPA is directly accountable to the executive branch of the United States' tripartite
system of government. Therefore, responsibilities assigned to the President under this amendment
are assumed to be transferred to the EPA.
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(1) methods for discovering and investigating facilities at which hazardous
or solid wastes have been disposed of or otherwise come to be located;
(2) methods for evaluating, including analyses of relative cost, and
remedying any releases or threats of releases from facilities which pose
substantial danger to the public health or the environment;
(3) methods and criteria for determining the appropriate extent of removal,
remedy, and other measures authorized by this chapter;
(4) means of assuring that remedial action measures are cost-effective.
Commentary to Section 4(A): Part (A) of Section 4 directs the
President via the EPA to create a national scheme by which RCRA
wastes are catalogued. It also directs the President to establish
government guidance on the appropriateness of private parties'
response costs. By providing this type of scheme within RCRA,
courts will have a ready reference for determining whether the costs
plaintiffs' seek to recover through restitution actions are appropriate.
Section 4:
(B) Any costs of response incurred by any person bringing an action for
restitution under section 6972(a)(2) of this title must be consistent with the
national contingency scheme.
Commentary to Section 4(B): This section provides guidance for
potential RCRA litigants, requiring that plaintiffs prove their response
costs are consistent with the NCS proposed in Section 4(A). This
requirement ensures that costs sought to be recovered in restitution
actions are appropriate. It relieves courts from having to make
determinations regarding which response costs are recoverable and
which litigant should bear the burden of proving the appropriateness
of the costs sought to be recovered.
Section 5- Notice Provisions.
Section 5 amends § 6972(b)(2)(A) to read:
Actions prohibited
No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section
prior to thirty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the endangerment
to-
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(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur,
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed or to be contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section
Commentary to Section 5: Section 5 amends the current notice
provision in RCRA's citizen suit provision. The notice provision, as
amended, will facilitate private plaintiffs' injunctive remedies under
the statute by allowing them to bring a cause of action sooner." It
will also provide for faster alleviation of endangerments, thus
achieving one of RCRA's primary goals.4
9
The proposed amendment is intended to avoid previous problems associated
with a private plaintiff's inability to obtain restitution for past cleanup costs and
limited ability to procure injunctive relief under RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B).
The proposed amendment attempts to produce a comprehensive scheme by which
restitution may be awarded to a private plaintiff under RCRA's citizen suit
provision even if the action for relief is brought after the contamination ceases
to present an imminent and substantial endangerment. First, it expressly
delineates what relief a plaintiff may obtain, specifying injunctive relief and
restitution. Next, it addresses when an action for such relief may be brought.
Third, it permits defendants to seek contribution from other responsible parties.
Fourth, it provides a limitations period by which restitution and contribution
actions can be governed. Fifth, it creates a national contingency scheme, which
requires the EPA to catalogue RCRA wastes and determine which costs are
appropriate for private party remediation of such wastes, and it compels
plaintiffs' response costs to be consistent with the national contingency scheme.
Finally, it shortens existing notice provisions to expand plaintiffs' injunctive
remedies.
These changes will result in more equitable outcomes for private parties
than RCRA's current citizen suit provision. Furthermore, they encourage the
private sector to participate in environmental enforcement actions. Finally, they
produce a statutory scheme which is consistent with RCRA's goal of requiring
both prompt waste cleanup and equitable apportionment of liability for waste
contamination.
468. See supra part I.D.
469. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although RCRA was intended to provide expeditious cleanup of hazardous
and solid waste sites, it has failed to achieve its purpose. The EPA, as a result
of budget constraints, has been unable to realize the effective enforcement of
RCRA regulations. The private sector's financial assistance, in the form of legal
initiatives brought under RCRA's citizen suit provision, would help alleviate the
EPA's burden by providing supplementary enforcement actions. However, the
inadequacies of RCRA's citizen suit provision have created a vague and
complicated statutory scheme which has produced unfair results in the private
sector for plaintiffs and defendants. It not only denies private recovery of
restitution for past costs, but it denies contribution and imposes burdensome time
constraints on plaintiffs. Because of these inadequacies, the existing provision
fails to effectuate RCRA's purpose.
Judicial action cannot adequately resolve the various problems posed by
RCRA's citizen suit provision. Judicial response to RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B)'s deficiencies has produced a split between two federal circuits
and a United States Supreme Court opinion that, while resolving the split in the
circuits, does not adequately address the statute's problems. No circuit opinion
has rendered solutions to the problems created by the current provision.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has been unable to procure adequate
resolution of the problems posed by section 6972(a)(1)(B). However, Congress
has the power to protect the environment and the rights of private parties by
amending RCRA's citizen suit provision to allow equitable restitution of
response costs in situations when the contaminated property ceases to present an
imminent and substantial endangerment.
Viki Panos
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/7
